On Asking the Right Questions: A Response to David Hollinger

David Hollinger, holder of an endowed chair in American history at the University of California at Berkeley and President-elect of the Organization of American Historians, just asked the proverbial $64,000 question in the Townsend Center for the Humanities's Point of View Series: if forced into a choice between being really public and being really good, what should Berkeley faculty choose? Here's his own answer:

My experiences at Berkeley as a graduate student in the 1960s were transforming. I owe almost everything to Berkeley. I was able to come here because it was really public. But that is not what changed me. Many places were really public. I was changed because Berkeley was really good.

I now believe the risks to quality are more dangerous than the risks to public access. To be sure, if fees go up, fewer people like me could come, but what these people would get will be of greater value. Perhaps I am wrong to prefer this alternative? I hope those who lean the other way will publicly defend the taking of the risk of diminished quality, rather than ignoring the question.

Those of us wondering about similar questions and choices in New York ought to keep in mind the fiscal and structural differences between our situation and California's. Lisa Krieger provides a useful primer over at the Mercury News. The core problem she identifies is the same one that Hollinger focuses on:

Plummeting state support: Since 1990, state spending per student has dropped by half in inflation-adjusted dollars. While the state paid about 90 percent of a student's education 40 years ago, it now pays 69 percent for California State University students and 62 percent for those in the University of California system.

Here at SUNY Fredonia, our president recently posted a powerpoint slide at a press conference on the SUNY strategic plan that showed a 2/3 decline in inflation-adjusted state spending per student over the same time period, while a few weeks earlier our chancellor's office published statistics that showed that state support for the SUNY equivalents of the CSU and UC systems has dropped to about 35% and 50%, respectively. One way of understanding how much worse SUNY's situation is than CSU's and UC's is to blow up the charts on "Shifting the cost of education to students": at CSU, CA still contributed over $8700 per student in 2008-2009, while at UC, CA contributed over $14500 per student. By contrast, if Governor Paterson's education cuts are not restored by the NYS legislature--and it's looking very unlikely that we'll see any restoration to any sectors but K-12 and community colleges--SUNY Fredonia will be getting around $2500 per student in 2010-2011.

Given our experience in NY, I think it would be fair to question one of the premises of Hollinger's argument. Fee increases at public universities don't enhance quality, as his "if fees go up, fewer people like me could come, but what these people would get will be of greater value" might seem to imply. They don't even maintain it. The key question is "greater value" than what? What fee increases allow for is "greater value" than would exist without them. They slow the bleeding, but they don't stop it.

Hollinger identifies the source of the bleeding with great precision:

even the most optimistic of souls usually will grant that the project of reversing the anti-tax politics of California is a formidable one, and not likely to be achieved prior to the time that the excellence of the UC system in general and of Berkeley in particular will be severely challenged by diminished state support. We need to remember that a recent, credible poll found that 69% of California voters prefer to keep Proposition 13 in place. Other polls reveal that opposition to increased income tax for high earners is sustained by the belief of 19% of the American public that they are in the top 1% of income earners, and by the belief of another 20% that they will join that 1% within their lifetimes. California politicians who win elections do not mention services and taxes in the same sentence.

While he supports the efforts of colleagues like George Lakoff to change the way California voters think and vote about public universities--not as education factories, but as economic engines, quality of place engines, and moral engines critical to American democracy--Hollinger wonders what UC Berkeley should do in the meantime. Should they hold the line for Berkeley's publicness and run the very real risk of no longer "being one of the world's leading centers of learning"? He believes this is "hollow bravado and wishful thinking." He is not willing to run the risk that "Being really public--above all keeping fees low and access high--might require a diminution in the intellectual quality of the services that UC in general and Berkeley in particular offer the state of California."

Now, Berkeley is one of the few public universities in the nation that may be in a position to raise its fees high enough to survive the tuition trap that Christopher Newfield and others have identified. If state funds that had gone into supporting Berkeley were to be fairly distributed across the rest of the UC system, or, more generally, if all the UC campuses were able to offer differential tuition rates and the savings in state support were reinvested in the CSU system, then there would be little problem with Hollinger's argument. If certain UC schools were to shift wholeheartedly into the high-tuition/high-aid model to do as much as they could to preserve their quality during a fiscal crisis, and if the savings in state support were reinvested in other UC and CSU schools to do as much as possible to preserve access to public higher education during the downturn, then what's the problem?

Well, there's no guarantee that Sacramento politicians would instead choose to reinvest such savings in state support for Berkeley and other UC campuses into roads, or prisons, or K-12, or Medicaid. In fact, with CA's budget deficit on the order of $20B last I checked, it's almost certain that reductions in state support would go straight into that particular budgetary black hole. So accelerating the path to privatization means that access is very likely to be diminished across CA's higher education systems (even if administrators in UC and CSU were to do a little redistribution of the ways state funds are allocated across their systems to the lower-tuition schools). It seems there's no evading the horns of Hollinger's dilemma.

Again, New York's experience is instructive. UUP President Phil Smith was at his most convincing during his visit to Fredonia when he pointed out that over the decades, SUNY's health science centers have been sending more and more of the revenue they generate not to the rest of the SUNY system but to the state general fund:

Phil gave a very specific example of why he is convinced that augmenting existing SUNY revenue streams and developing new ones won't result in net gains for SUNY. He pointed out that when he arrived at Upstate in 1978, state support was around 47%--and now it's down around 10%. The state saw an opportunity to take advantage of the income the health science centers were generating: first they forced hospitals to pay for their own debt service, then their own fringe benefits, then the cost of collective bargaining increases, and finally this year they asked for over $20M to make up for retirement fund losses. If that opportunism is extended to the entire system, and the doctorals see state support drop from around 50% to around 10%, the comprehensives see state support drop from around 35% to around 10%, and so on, then eventually the question will arise of whether UUP should be negotiating with the state or with the entering freshman class and their families. Furthermore, if even UB and Stony Brook see state support drop faster than they can raise tuition, it's likely that the imbalances caused by SUNY's own formulae for distributing state funds to campuses--where Stony Brook has 57% state support and UB has near 50%--are going to be exacerbated even further, as more state money is sent to them than to the comprehensives.

Since it's hard to imagine that quality hasn't suffered at Upstate Medical Center in the last 32 years, however, Smith's long-term perspective shows that the picture is even grimmer than Hollinger portrays it. Even if California limits the damage to quality at a pair or a handful of campuses by switching them over to a high-fee/high-aid model, both quality and access would go down sharply at the rest of them. Accelerating the pace of privatization at a few campuses in one state digs the structural hole deeper for public higher education across that state.

This is why I believe that every campus in the UC, CSU, SUNY, and CUNY system should be given the responsibility of managing its own tuition. So long as each system sets a standard tuition rate for all its campuses according to a rational, fair, equitable, and predictable policy, so long as every major constituency and stakeholder has a seat at the table and is looking at the same data in the setting of both system and campus tuition rates, and so long as any special tuition increases by individual campuses are approved by their local student government, faculty governance, and college council or trustees, then I am confident that affordability can be maintained and revenues from increased student fees can be reinvested directly in trying to maintain campus quality.

But this is also why I believe that California and New York need to establish floors beneath which state funding for public higher education will not fall. The current system of cutting state support for public colleges and universities faster than tuition has increased at them--which has been in place for roughly two generations in both states--is unsustainable. UC, CSU, SUNY, and CUNY simply can't keep increasing the numbers of students they serve without their revenues keeping pace with enrollment increases.

The question, then, is not whether partial privatization should happen--it has been happening for a long time now and reversing it will take even longer--but instead how far partial privatization of public universities should go, and to what ends.  Former SUNY chancellor D. Bruce Johnstone suggests that it be harnessed to the goals of providing "genuine equality of opportunity" and "widening higher education access" (SUNY at 60, 296). Here's his argument why some student fees are justified:

Elsewhere (no more so than in Africa, where I have spent much of my recent scholarly attention), accessibility is too often thought of as flowing naturally from free tuition, free room and board, and pocket money--even though no country (least of all in Sub-Saharan Africa) can afford this without greatly limiting both the capacity and quality of their college and university offerings. And the consequence to the severe limitations on capacity is that there is room only for those who pass very rigorous entrance examinations, which in turn is possible mainly for those who have had the advantages of extensive tutoring and private secondary schools. The consequence, of course, is free higher education mainly to the wealthy, who could and would pay at least some tuition if they had to, and very little opportunity to the poor, the isolated, or ethnic and linguistic minorities. In the State University of New York, as in public systems in all states, we expand our resources and our capacity with the combination of state tax revenues and modest public tuitions. (296)

Johnstone goes on to argue that efforts to "expand opportunities"--including "abundant means-tested financial assistance, admissions practices that are sensitive to backgrounds and the nature of our diverse secondary schools, special programs of counseling and academic assistance to the educationally disadvantaged, a range of initial opportunities differing in academic selectivity, and second chances"--help "lessen the essentially unmerited simple transmission of opportunities from privileged families to their children" and make "American higher education...one of the truly good deals to the American taxpayer" (296).

Another former SUNY chancellor, John B. Clark, goes one step further in his summary of CUNY Chancellor Matthew Goldstein's proposed "New York Compact":

In the Compact, there would be a broad partnership among the State, SUNY, CUNY, faculty, staff, students, alumni, industry, and private benefactors in a united effort to raise funds for public higher education....

Under the provisions of the compact, the state would be responsible for the so-called "mandatory costs" of operating the public systems of higher education (e.g., personnel costs, fringe benefits, utilities, etc.) and a set percentage of additional funds to invest in SUNY and CUNY for educational purposes. SUNY and CUNY would be responsible for their portion through fundraising, commercial partnerships, and generating additional monies through savings and efficiencies on their local campuses. Students would pay modest tuition increases on a rational and predictable basis based upon an agreed upon price index, with the important provision that no qualified student would be denied admission or matriculation to SUNY or CUNY because of the lack of financial means. (220)

So once again the questions of the proper ratio of public to private funding and of a base level of public support for public higher education arise, this time with other revenue streams than student fees added to the equation.  It is these questions that faculty should be putting to politicians, citizens, and taxpayers in their states, as well as to each other.  In this sense, Shannon Jackson's contribution to the Townsend Center's Point of View series provides a clearer accounting of the choices we all face than does Hollinger's essay.

Still, although Hollinger is wrong to accept the terms laid out by the forced choice between quality and access--both in terms of how he formulates the problem (CA's and NY's fiscal crises are of such a large magnitude that we're going to see both quality and access go down in the next few years at least, no matter what choices we make) and imagines solutions (we need to build support for new public higher education compacts in CA and NY, not just assent to raising tuition at a few campuses more than the rest)--his mistakes point the way to still larger questions:  just what should the role of the federal government be during and after the great recession? what shape should a national compact for public higher education take?

I would suggest that there are at least three paths by which we may arrive at some good answers to these questions:

• Updating the Land-Grant Tradition: Newfield showed in Ivy and Industry that there have been times in American history when political and corporate elites understood that basic research is risky, expensive, and invaluable and hence that its risks, costs, and benefits should be spread as widely as possible. This consensus translated into serious federal support of research at public universities. Newfield makes a strong case in Unmaking the Public University that the pendulum needs to swing back from Bayh-Dole and updating the land-grant tradition is one key way in which the federal government can make it happen. State and federal investment in creativity and innovation offers real returns.
• Generalizing the G.I. Bill: There should be other forms of national service than military service that also provide tuition vouchers to those who choose to perform them (Teach for America comes to mind).
• Growing Pell Grants: Since inflation alone dictates that tuition will rise indefinitely, the federal government needs to index the Pell Grants to cost-of-living increases; if more states follow NY in creating their own versions of TAP to supplement Pell Grants, then the most financially vulnerable students could stop seeing debt as a barrier to applying for and entering public colleges and universities (and even some private ones).

In a nutshell, state and federal governments should collaborate in making the public option as attractive as possible--not just to students, but to higher education institutions, as well. It's only when well-endowed private universities see it in their interest to join state systems that we'll actually be able to adjust the ratio of public to private support of public higher education downward without hurting quality and access and destroying educational capacity.

[Update 1 (5/15/10, 1:45 pm): Charles Schwartz from the University of California is having trouble leaving a comment, so I'm adding what he emailed me to this post itself:

You quote data from University officials (east and west) that shows sharp declines in per-student funding from the state to public universities. That data can be very misleading, for research universities like UC and SUNY, since it refers to the whole I&R budget. There is an old habit of hiding the cost of faculty research and related graduate programs under the rubric of expenditures for "Instruction". Research is a great public good; but undergraduate education is seen, nowadays, as mostly a private good, to be paid for by the students (and their families). So by pumping up what we call "the per-student cost of education" we give state officials an excuse to cut our public funding; and the resulting increase in student fees has bad effects on access.

By my calculations, undergraduate student fees at UC cover just over 100% of the cost of providing undergraduate education. (See details at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~schwrtz/.)

I know many colleagues are afraid to "separate" research from teaching. I don't want that but I do ask for honest accounting; if we can have a decent public understanding about who now pays for what, then we can go on to a decent debate about who should pay for what.

Charles Schwartz

My own inclination is to ask for more baseline federal support of research--and not just at a few "national research universities," as some at Berkeley have called for--and more state support of teaching at all public colleges and universities, so I think separating out the costs makes a lot of sense. As Schwartz's colleague Christopher Newfield has shown in Ivy and Industry, the idea that research deserves public support precisely because it is difficult, risky, and its benefits are so widespread but diffuse was a common-sense consensus at different periods of American political history in the twentieth century. In an age when so many nations are investing in their own research capacity, I would love to see the Obama administration put American research excellence and innovation on the front burner.

The point that's worth making about the costs of teaching is that most colleges and universities in the U.S. (and indeed around the world) are skimping here in order to fund their research by relying on exploited and underpaid graduate student assistants and contingent faculty to do more and more of the actual teaching on campus. I'd like to see a calculation of what the costs of teaching would be with full-time faculty covering about 75%-85% of all sections. All our hard-working colleagues off the tenure track who want to get on it need to be moved onto it by whatever means necessary. All teachers, whatever their employment status, should be given compensation befitting their contribution to the success of their students and institutions.

Finally, most of the institutions in SUNY are not research universities (only 4 of the 64 are), although of course important research takes place at virtually all of them. Given that SUNY has over the years chosen to shift state dollars to the doctoral-granting institutions in the system to fund their research activities, and that our own Faculty-Student Association at my own regional university contributes more to the campus operating budget than does the state of New York, we've become more and more reliant on tuition and fees paid by students to avoid layoffs. If the NYS budget turns out to be as bad as I fear, we may not be able to keep this up.]

[Update 2 (5/19/10, 3:00 pm): In their own way, Peter Brown, Tenured Radical, Christopher Newfield, and Marc Bousquet each helps us begin to account for the costs of neoliberal universities' skimping on the real costs of active teaching.]

Michael Meranze, Meet Jean-Francois Lyotard

Here's hoping the faculty at SUNY's doctoral-granting institutions read Michael Meranze's response to the University of California's Commission on the Future's first public hearing.

As I read it, I kept flashing back to key moments in Jean-Francois Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition. Not quite the parts that Michael Berube focused on in What's Liberal About the Liberal Arts? (having to do with legitimation via paralogy and narrative rather than consensus)--well, at least not immediately. No, the parts that go like this:

The decision-makers...attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They allocate our lives for the growth of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on its optimizing the system's performance--efficiency. The application of this criterion to all our games necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is, commensurable) or disappear. (xxix)

And this:

By terror I mean the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him. He is silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has been threatened (there are many ways to prevent one from playing). The decision makers' arrogance, which in principle has no equivalent in the sciences, consists in the exercise of terror. It says, "Adapt your aspirations to our ends--or else." (63)

And this:

the process of delegitimation and the predominance of the performance criterion are sounding the knell of the age of the Professor: a professor is no more competent than memory bank networks in transmitting established knowledge, no more competent than interdisciplinary teams in imagining new moves or new games. (53; see more generally "Education and Its Legitimation through Performativity," 47-53)

Yeah, I know, many a digital diploma mill has sprung up from the last quotation, particularly when combined with Lyotard's bizarre semi-celebration of "the temporary contract" (66). But it's the prior two passages that concern me here today. What Meranze helps make clear is that Lyotard's target in The Postmodern Condition is not simply Habermas's commitment to legitimation by consensus, with its "violence to the heterogeneity of language games" (xxv). Actually, it's more specific than that: the supplantation of appeals to truth and justice by appeals to efficiency and performativity. I wonder if by this criterion Lyotard would find the UCOF to be a terrorist organization?

Be that as it may, it's worth noting that Meranze's critiques pick up where Berube leaves off in his discussion of tuition, circa 2006:

your average state university now receives only a token amount of financial support from the state. Institutions like Penn State and the University of Michigan are nearly off the public books altogether, receiving only a tiny fraction of their budgets from state funds. The state provided 45 percent of Penn State's budget as recently as 1984-1985, when in-state tuition was $2,562; that figure is now down to 10 percent, and in-state tuition is $11,508. The correlation speaks for itself. The costs of college, in state after state, have been passed along to individual families, as higher education has gradually been reconceived as a private investment for individuals rather than a social good for the entire nation. (281-282)

And here:

That's what "partial privatization" is all about: passing the social costs of public goods onto individuals, leaving students and families to fend for themselves as best they can. If this is fine with you, so be it: you're a conservative or a libertarian. If you think this is a suspect or foolhardy enterprise, you may already be a liberal or progressive. (283)

And if you think it's a terrorist attack on truth, justice, and the heterogeneity of language games, then you're probably a French postmodernist.

Neither Berube nor Christopher Newfield are, but they both argue, in What's Liberal about the Liberal Arts? and Unmaking the Public University, that the attack on public universities and the attack on public institutions of all kinds have gone hand-in-hand in the dominant forms of conservative and libertarian politics of the past generation. What remains to be seen, in both California and New York, is whether some other politics might be possible.

[Update 1 (5:40 am): Sarah Amsler takes on managerialism in British higher ed.]

What Can New York Learn from Michigan and California When It Comes to Public Higher Ed?

In Unmaking the Public University (2009), Christopher Newfield takes a careful look at the fortunes of the University of Michigan and University of California as they have responded to "declining public money" by "increasing private funds" (174). He takes direct aim at the failure of Robert Zemsky, Gregory Wegner, and William Massy's Remaking the Public University (2005) to provide evidence of a "causal relationship between 'going to market' and new revenues" (175). Since this is the fundamental ground of dispute between the leadership of SUNY and UUP over New York's Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act, it would make a big difference whether Newfield's analysis proves that it is structurally impossible for the PHEE&IA to produce new revenues for SUNY or simply identifies problems to avoid. Today, I'll follow up on my earlier response to Newfield by arguing that Unmaking the University actually supports the latter view.

I'll start by focusing on Newfield's attempts to rebut Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy's portrayal as a success story of the University of Michigan's strategy to "diversify its income sources" in response to a "deindustrializing state economy and falling tax revenues in the early 1980s" via "increas[ing] private fund-raising, continuously rais[ing] tuition, and support[ing] entrepreneurial faculty members in their quest for larger shares of both federal money and industry sponsorship" (174). To do that, Newfield points out that

• UM was a "principal beneficiary" of a boom in public research funding from the early 1980s through the mid-2000s, sparked by federal research money for the health sciences, which is one of UM's areas of great strength (175);
• even though UM already had a strong fundraising operation and the largest alumni base in the nation, its "receipts did not outpace philanthropic growth for American universities as a whole" (176);
• even though UM raised tuition and the percentage of out-of-state students in each entering class sharply and often, "much of these revenues replaced lost state funding rather than offered new money" (176); and
• UM's rank in "U.S. News & World Report's infamous reputational survey" declined from 8th in 1987 to 25th in 2003; its selectivity did not improve; with so many out-of-state students in the system and especially at Ann Arbor, UM failed to advance its original mission of "educating the population of Michigan itself" (which is "well below the national average in the percentage of the state's population that receives bachelor's or advanced degrees"); its share of African-American students declined so sharply that even after years of improvements, its 2005 freshman class's proportion of Africans Americans was about half the state's; and its share of students from lower-income families as measured by the percentage of students with Pell Grants was about half of UC Santa Barbara's (176).

Thus, it should be no surprise that Newfield concludes: "While UM has done an effective job of protecting its Ann Arbor flagship, it has not protected the quality of the UM system, of Michigan higher education overall, or of higher education access for the residents of the state" (176).  Highlighting the costs of the UM model is part of Newfield's larger strategy to convince other state systems not to try to imitate it.  His core argument that declining public funds can't even be replaced, much less augmented, by private fund-raising (in the form of tuition and private philanthropy), can be found on pages 183-189 of Unmaking the Public University, but for the greatest impact I suggest turning to the May 2006 study Current Budget Trends and the Future of the University of California by the UC Academic Council's University Committee on Planning and Budget, on which Newfield was a principal co-author.

I'll hit the high points for you via reference to both:

• their report confirmed UC's own data (in which UC's share of California's general fund declined from 7% in 1970-1971 to 3.1% in 2006-2007) with "a dismal tale of an overall trend of declining education funding in a state with one of the largest concentrations of wealthy individuals and industries in the world," buttressed by such measures as "declining state share of 'UC Core Funds' (down to 45% around 2005 from 60% in 2001), and the state's declining contribution measured as a share of personal income" (UPU 185; cf. CBT 6 for a great chart that illustrates that state support for "that portion of the campus budgets that are directly concerned with the everyday educational mission" has declined from a peak above 75% in 1985-1986, to around 60% in both 1991-1992 and 2001-2002, to around 45% in 2005-2006; cf. CBT 18 for a chart that compares projected state support of "UC Core Funds" under the Compact to a restoration of 2001-2002 levels; cf. CBT 7 for UC's share of CA's general fund charted from 1985-2006; and cf. CBT 8 and 13 for UC's share of state personal income from 1985-2006, which declined from a high of near .38% in 1987 to near .20% in 2006);
• their report projected that the May 2004 "Higher Education Compact" among UC, California State University, and the governor of California, would leave the UC system in 2010-2011 "about $1.2B a year behind its extrapolated 2001 funding level, and twice as much behind its extrapolated 1990 funding level (on a base of about $3.3B in state general fund money in 2001)" (UPU 185-186);
• their report projected that under the Compact state funding per student would decline from a little over $13K in 2001-2002 to a little under $10K in 2010-2011 (UPU 186; cf. CBT 18-19 for more detail); and
• their report noted that using private philanthropy to replace the lost state support under the Compact would require UC to raise $30B in new funding for its endowment--that is, pass Harvard within 5 years (CBT 22-23).

Unfortunately, the most recent national data that I could find used different measures than Newfield's committee's study--state support for higher education per $1000 in personal income and per capita, for FY 2008-2009 and FY 2009-2010--so without knowing CA's total personal income in those years, I can't determine how on-target its projections were (of course I'd have to ignore the bump from federal stimulus support). But even if the study overestimated the decline in public support of UC, its basic point that the Compact locked in post-9/11 cuts to state support of public higher education in California and put UC on a private fund-raising treadmill whose pace would be unsustainable for most schools in the system looks pretty prescient today.

Even more prescient, however, was the worst-case scenario that the study contemplated, which it called the "Public Funding Freeze" model. What does it entail?

Another downturn in state finances and continued political opposition to tax increases prompts state and University leaders to reluctantly concede that it would be better to conduct an organized shift away from public funding than to suffer further uncertainty amidst a new cycle of budget crises. They decide to become a "state-assisted university" and to "privatize" centrally and systematically. State leaders agree to cap the General Fund at 2005-2006 levels (in nominal dollars), to allow the General Fund share to decline to 15% of the university's budget (or about 1/3 of the "core") by the end of 2010-2011. (CBT 29)

In this situation, "the public spends half the share of its income on UC tha[n] it had a decade earlier (down to 0.15% of per capita personal income by 2011)" (UBU 187; cf. CBT 29 for the summary table). The report's executive summary explains the ramifications of such a freeze:

The state continues to carry a structural deficit, remains politically polarized, has expensive needs in health and human services, and awaits new budgetary surprises such as unfunded health care obligations for retired state employees. These problems may encourage some to move UC toward a "high-tuition/high-aid" model in tandem with aggressive private fundraising, increased industry partnerships, and expanded sales and services. This fourth scenario, however, cannot actually be achieved with private fundraising: to obtain the billion dollars that will be lost by comparison with the Compact, and to obtain it in unrestricted payouts, the University would need to raise $25 billion in unrestricted gifts. To reach the 2001-02 funding level, more than $54 billion would be needed. Alternately, tuition increases big enough to fill the gap would shrink enrollments and, at the same time, reduce the quality of the university’s student body. The overall UC system would continue in name but not in reality, as the most prestigious campuses draw on a national student pool and collect large amounts of non-resident tuition while other campuses struggle with diminished resources, fewer programs, and reduced research capacity. Wasteful intercampus competition may arise, in part in the form of the budgetary fragmentation that the Master Plan had in its time brought to a close. Since undergraduate instruction is disproportionately dependent on the state General Fund, such changes would seriously damage the assumption of a high-quality curriculum for all qualified students. The Public Funding Freeze would end the UC system as we know it. (CBT 2; cf. 29-34 for the gory details)

Newfield's commentary in Unmaking the Public University says it all: "The outcome would be something like what Michigan, New York, and Texas have now: systems where relatively poor and academically struggling institutions coexist with one or two research flagships in a ph[]ase stratification" (189).

In other words, following the UM model would mean that California would move from a situation where all eligible high school graduates could attend a public research flagship to 84% of them making do with "the more limited opportunities of a regional state college" (189). This would entail "major economic and sociocultural losses" (190):

State colleges have fewer resources, offer less or little research, and generally place fewer of their students in positions of social or professional leadership. Students coming out of them have lower incomes than students from major research universities (public or private) and pay less in taxes back to the states that educated them. On average, state college graduates have more limited prospects. States that send a higher proportion of their public university students to regional rather than research universities have lower average incomes, and, we can infer, more socioeconomic stratification within their college-educated middle classes. (190)

Newfield argues plausibly that what the majority of students gain at research universities via exposure to "both the results of advanced research and the process through which research creates knowledge" (190) and from the resulting "practices of intellectual independence" (191) are "more developed capacities to innovate and restructure systems on an ongoing basis" (192). But for a public university to successfully combine the quality of teaching at small liberal arts colleges with the exposure to advanced research methods and results of Ivy League universities, it needs significant state support for such an expensive and labor-intensive endeavor. When that support is withdrawn, "faculty are not hired or replaced, more teaching is done with less expensive lecturers and teaching assistants, class size is increased, and classes are dropped" (192). Private giving, by contrast, "is almost always restricted, and goes to targeted research, sports, trademark-building projects, and the special interests of donors" (192):

Private funding does not come in sufficient supply to support core operations: teaching lower-division courses, writing tutorials, calculus and bench laboratory experience, language instruction, seminar interaction, independent study, and well-staffed large lectures in which students continue to get adequate personal attention. Personal attention is the core element of high-quality mass higher education: the brilliant top will do fine on its own, but the other 95%--with plenty of potential but less experience, training, entitlement, and confidence--need the kind of highly developed teaching infrastructure that costs serious money. (193-194)

In both his co-authored study and book, then, Newfield has built a strong case that core university operations--high-quality mass teaching and research--couldn't be well-supported across the UC system in a budget freeze, even were tuition to be raised to $15K per year for in-state students. 

Now, in showing that Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy are wrong to accept both "the shift from general public funding to a 'user fee' model in which students and their families pay privately for their education" and the notion that "higher education [should seek to] replace[s] lost public funding with higher user fees" (175), Newfield does leave himself some wiggle room when he acknowledges that "[i]ncreasing 'user fees' is a traditional strategy that is fully compatible with public funding and does not in itself signal a new adaptation to market forces" (176). Sure, it's an effective critique of Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy's choice of UM as a key supporting example--rather than being both "market-smart" and "mission-centered," Newfield's analysis suggests that it is neither--but it also allows him to implicitly accept the existence of some tuition at public universities.  If it is invested directly into enhancements of teaching and research, if it augments a firm base of public support for core operations, and if it remains low enough to not act as a barrier to student access, then some tuition is justifiable.

But how to identify what a firm base of public support for public higher education ought to be?  Newfield's analysis suggests that we track the following measures in New York over long periods of time:

• SUNY share of NY's general fund
• NY general fund share of SUNY's operating budget
• NY general fund share of SUNY's core operations
• SUNY share of per capita personal income in NY
• per capita personal income in NY invested in SUNY
• amount per $1000 in personal income in NY invested in SUNY

If we use data trends and national comparisons to ask ourselves where we would like to see these numbers go in the future, why, and how to get there, then we can take a debate over the PHEE&IA that's so far relied mostly on tall tales, overheated rhetoric, and emotional appeals and turn it into something that will be useful to all concerned about the future of SUNY, whether or not the PHEE&IA passes.

Unfortunately, I haven't been able to track down my favorite figure, the 4th on the above list. Knowing SUNY's share of NY per capita income would be the best way of comparing levels across the region and the country.

Some of this data is publicly available, though. From the Grapevine study I linked to above, I found out that I'm paying a little bit more than the state average into the SUNY system this academic year. But even if I broke into six figures (and I'm not even close), my total commitment to SUNY via taxes would be just over $525 per $100K. That's a lot more than I donate to Hamilton College each year (Princeton doesn't need my money). Restoring progressivity to NY's tax system would allow those who benefitted the most from their own higher education to contribute their fair share to provide opportunities for the next generation--and an incentive to reduce their taxes via private giving to higher ed.

In addition, SUNY has been sharing some of this data with state-wide and campus governance leaders.  Assuming they're using the same calculations as Newfield for "core operations," the level of state support for SUNY core operations is comparable to his figures.  General fund support bounced around in the high 60% and low 70% range in the early '90s, declined sharply into the low 60% range in the late '90s, climbed into the mid-60% range for the first 3 years of the 2000s, plunged sharply again for the next 3 years into the mid-50% range, recovered for the next 3 years into the high 50% and low 60% range, and then dropped sharply again this academic year to near 50%.   But all signs suggest that 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 will see us fall into the low-to-mid 40% range. So in a sense UC's fortunes could be understood as the "canary in the mineshaft" for SUNY. While both systems suffered large cuts in 1995 and 2003, SUNY managed to keep significantly more state support for core operations. But we're approaching where UC was back in 2005-2006.

It's worth noting, however, that university colleges like my own institution have been bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of declining state support within the SUNY system. The average share of state support for the comprehensives tends to lag about 15 percentage points behind the doctorates in SUNY. Whereas the doctorates have fallen from the high 50% range to the low 50% range in the last 3 academic years, the comprehensives have declined from the mid-40% range to the mid-30% range. And in fact at SUNY Fredonia, the state's share will fall below 20% for next academic year if the Governor's cuts go through. This is because we gain revenue not only from student tuition and fees (along with a relatively low level of financial aid compared to our peer institutions in SUNY), but also from residence halls, food services, and the campus bookstore. It's often quoted that our Faculty Student Association's activities generate more revenue for the campus than does state support. I wouldn't be surprised if the average regular at our campus Starbucks (a franchise run by our FSA) spends more in a year than she is taxed by the state to support SUNY Fredonia.

And that trend is likely to accelerate here and across the state in the next several years, whether or not the PHEE&IA passes. If it does go down in flames, students are likely to see a much higher tuition increase than they otherwise would have gotten. If they think they have a better chance of influencing New York's dysfunctional political system than their local campus leadership, more power to them. They'll need it.

We'll all need it, in fact. We'll need a range of tactics and a concerted effort to craft an overall strategy to bring the figures Newfield suggests we track back to equitable and sustainable levels.

How to Avoid the Tuition Trap: A Response to Christopher Newfield

In Unmaking the Public University, Christopher Newfield asks the fundamental question at the heart of UUP's opposition to the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act (PHEE&IA):

If the university is just another cog in an economic system that is about getting ahead, charging as much as you can, maximizing your returns, and buying your way to the top, why should the general public pay for it? Why should the general public, whose income has stagnated for thirty years, give more taxes to a system that lets the top 1 percent purchase a VIP seat, or that favors applicants from six-figure families? (182)

His question builds on what he calls "the tuition trap":

The public is worried about college affordability, but its public university raises its fees. The university thus implies it does not actually depend on public funding, since it has the private resource of higher tuition at its fingertips. The university may also deepen this impression--that it can do without more public funding--by saying how good it is in spite of public funding cuts. Even worse, it may declare strong public funding a thing of the past in order to justify tuition increases or expanded fund-raising. Taxpayers then reasonably ask, if the university does not need more money, why does it keep raising fees? And since it keeps raising fees, why should we give it more public money? (182)

In a recent post at remaking the university, Newfield turned his answers to these questions from last November into talking points for the March 4 protests. He correctly points out that at the University of California tuition increases don't actually succeed in raising much revenue (relative to the overall budget) and that the high-tuition/high-aid model puts universities on an accelerating treadmill that is not only impossible to keep up with for most, but also has real effects on access and affordability. The higher the tuition, the more student financial aid has to be increased, the more real student costs increase (even for those receiving financial aid), and the more in debt more students get (cf. Unmaking the Public University 187-189, 226-227).

Newfield is not the only analyst to have wrestled with the "tuition trap." Business officers and economists have been tracking it for years, as well. In a June 2005 study of tuition discounting from 1989-2004, Loren Loomis Hubbell and Lucie Lapovsky concluded:

Over the past 15 years, we have seen a dramatic rise in discounting. The stasis we see today could mean many things. There are several potential interpretations of willingness to pay and the effective use of enrollment management strategies to better maximize net tuition revenues. However, we continue to worry whether net tuition maximization and the commercialization of competitive pricing will become the next barrier to access. [my emphasis] Financially, greater stability in net tuition revenues will lead to greater stability for many institutions in budgeting and planning for the future.

While we believe that this is likely to be the case for the independent institutions, the outlook for public institutions could be quite different. The level of predictability of state support at these institutions has declined greatly in the past few years, leading to often-significant increases in tuition. The public sector is looking to understand how to effectively use tuition discounting to shape their classes and achieve their revenue goals. The action in tuition discounting will move to this sector of higher education. One area to watch: how the reduction in the price difference between public and independent higher education affects access. [my emphasis]

The higher public tuition levels go, the more attractive private colleges and universities look--especially to students from disadvantaged groups who can get into them--due to their large endowments and small student bodies that enable them to offer larger tuition discounts than public universities (or even go completely need-blind in admissions). But not everyone can get into highly selective colleges and universities--and most are not prepared to expand to solve the access problem generated by rising tuition at public universities.

That the interrelated crises of quality, affordability, and access are coming to a head was addressed directly by Paul Fain in The New York Times last November and indirectly by the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) in their February summary of how federal stimulus funds have been mitigating state funding declines across the country. But nobody has put the problem (and the solution) better than Newfield himself:

high-quality, large-scale public education requires strong public funding.... [H]igh-quality education for elites is cheap, since there are not that many students involved. High-quality education for the great majority is expensive, and private sources are unable to support it....

Administrators looked to private funding to solve the problems that the ascent of private over public funding helped create. The fact remains that private funding can build great universities for elites, but private funding cannot and will not do the same for society's majority....

[A]ccess can coexist with quality only by restoring and increasing public funding for the public university. Private sponsorship can support novel and important programs on a limited scale; in public education, it is not enough to fund high-quality core operations. High-quality mass higher education requires mass public funding: there is no way around how the numbers work.... It is only through public funding that the whole society can contribute to forming the next generation, rather than relying on the generally stagnant incomes of their students' parents.... (Unmaking 193-194, 271, 273)

So if I agree with Newfield's analysis of the "problem with privatization" at UC and his proposed solutions, how can I have been offering my qualified support for the PHEE&IA all month? Why do I believe that it actually represents SUNY's best hope for avoiding the tuition trap?

First, we need to understand that total state support for public higher education is indispensable. Check out the raw totals and percentage increases/decreases in recent years. While state support for SUNY operations will fall below $1B if the Governor's cuts go through, total support for higher education crossed the $5B mark. If all of that indeed went to SUNY (obviously, some goes to CUNY), you'd need an endowment on the order of $100B to comfortably replace that chunk of change. That's why it's so difficult to scale the elite privates' funding model up. (More on endowments soon.)

Second, we need to understand that total state support for public higher education remains a bargain for taxpayers in the vast majority of states. Check out the charts for how much each state spends per $1000 in personal income and per capita in FY09 and FY10. You'd be surprised how cheap NY's investment in public higher education really is. But you shouldn't be. The more you spread around the costs of higher education, the less it costs each person. That's just simple math. What we really need, then, is a base of federal support for public higher education that states and systems can build on. (But that's a subject for another post.)

Third, in the absence of that federal commitment or of widespread citizen/taxpayer/student pressure for it, and in the face of declining state revenues (5 straight quarters in NY, according to the Rockefeller Institute) and an end to federal stimulus funding to the states, there is very little chance that New York won't cut public higher education as much as it can in 2011-2012. To keep the shock to the system from being fatal, there is very little chance that New York won't raise tuition, as governors and legislatures always have in financial crises--haphazardly, as part of an austerity program, and the result of horse-trading and political negotiations, rather than any kind of strategic planning process or education-centered budgeting program. Whether or not the PHEE&IA becomes law, then, we're very likely to see reduced state support and higher tuition in SUNY's immediate future. (While I'm hopeful that reiterating the argument that public higher education can drive regional and state-wide economic development will free up some new state funding sources for SUNY, I'm not holding my breath. More on this topic later, too.) Without the PHEE&IA, there's nothing stopping the state from sweeping tuition dollars into the general fund to close the ever-growing projected deficits in New York.

Fourth, the PHEE&IA lays the groundwork for a better way of determining SUNY's tuition and enrollment policies and for understanding what they can and can't accomplish. With the power to determine these policies comes greater responsibility--for transparency, accountability, and results. Last week, I argued that critics of the PHEE&IA are completely missing the boat when it comes to SUNY's draft tuition policy. Today, however, I want to suggest that the SUNY comprehensive tuition policy draft doesn't go nearly far enough in recognizing and avoiding the tuition trap that Newfield has identified. The more the procedural checks and balances remain within the SUNY administration's and trustees' purview, the greater the probability they'll walk right into the tuition trap.

What SUNY needs is to really hit the reset button when it comes to setting tuition and enrollment policy. That means bringing in constituencies with a variety of interests to act as watchdogs on each other from the very start of the process. Students' primary concern is access and affordability, although they, too, care about quality. Faculty's interests are primarily about quality, although they, too, care about access and affordability. Alumni's primary concern is quality, although as parents they may well end up caring more about access and affordability. Administrators can gain a lot more than they lose by bringing them in from the start, via student government, faculty governance/union leadership, and alumni associations, at both campus and state-wide levels. For one thing, doing this would minimize the possibility of the kind of student and faculty protests that we saw on March 4th in California. If representatives from these various groups were working together from the start in developing a strategy for enhancing SUNY's quality, accessibility, and affordability, which would end with the presentation of a united front when it comes to the balance of taxpayer and student/family support sought in a given year, not only would the decision-making process be improved, but its legitimacy and efficacy would also be enhanced.

Who better to make sure that SUNY stays true to its mission than the very people and groups most invested in its success? The PHEE&IA can provide an opportunity for SUNY to avoid the tuition trap, learn from successes and mistakes in other states and systems, and set a national standard for inclusiveness in financial decision-making. It's up to SUNY student, faculty, and alumni leaders to make sure the administration and trustees understand this--and act on it.

[Update 1 (7:34 am): It's worth noting that my proposal would also go far to closing the trust gap that the SUNY/UUP debates reveal. The relative silence of faculty governance across SUNY has enabled many to assume the dispute is purely and simply between management and labor, administration and faculty. In the conference call today among governance leaders, I'm going to be advocating for the UFS to take a public stand in its own, independent, analysis of the PHEE&IA.]

[Update 2 (9:24 am): Looks like Newfield and I aren't alone in our desire to see the public matter in public higher education. Check out SUNY Plattsburgh professor Colin Read's case for SUNY as an engine of economic development and the various perspectives in the March 14th issue of The Chronicle of Higher Education, particularly Twain scholar and Pitzer president Laura Skandera Trombley's.]

[Update 3 (3/16/10, 3:27 pm): It's worth noting that the draft tuition policy defines the "Executive Committee/Chancellor's Cabinet" as "Advisory groups made up of representatives from senior management at SUNY System Administration, Faculty Senate, Faculty Council of Community Colleges and Student Assembly" (2). I'd like to see these organizations, a SUNY alumni organization, and UUP made equal partners with the SUNY System Administration.]

[Update 4 (3/26/10, 2:54 am): Smart analysis of the tuition trap and strategies to avoid it by Westminster College president Michael Bassis.]

Truth in Advertising; Or, Don't Send Out a Paper Airplane that Can Be Shot Down by a Spitball or Four

"DON'T BE FOOLED BY THE ACT. KEEP SUNY PUBLIC!"

Looks like the Full Metal Archivist and I can't even take onechan, imoto, and their friend out to brunch at the local diner after a sleepover party without having our stomachs assaulted by a "Paid Political/Advocacy Advertisement" with UUP and NYSUT logos on it, "Paid for by United University Professions," in today's Buffalo News. The stick to Jonathan Epstein's well-researched carrot on the economic impact of state investments in SUNY's medical schools like Buffalo HSC, this UUP ad directs readers to go to SaveSUNY.org and "Tell NY lawmakers to keep SUNY public." Unfortunately, rather than presenting a hard-hitting case outlining the danger to SUNY's future posed by the Governor's cuts and persuading taxpayers to pressure their representatives to keep investing in SUNY, the rest of the ad repeats the same tired talking points, leavened this time with even more misleading rhetoric and strangely out-of-date content. It's even more in need of a rewrite than the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act itself.

So let's go "FACT" by fact on UUP's critique of the PHEE&IA, starting with:

FACT: The Act would not produce additional revenue for SUNY. The state would pay less; students and parents would pay a lot more.

Here's how this one should read:

EDUCATED GUESS: We're pretty sure that with state revenues declining, we can't count on state legislators to restore the Governor's cuts. Since in this economy we're afraid to appeal directly to the citizens and taxpayers of NY to stand up for SUNY, nor do we trust them to be moved by arguments in favor of finding efficiencies elsewhere in the state budget and making NY's tax system more progressive, let's pass over our effectively conceding the point that the state is likely to cut SUNY this budget year no matter what. It's been doing that for a generation and more and none of our lobbying has done much of anything to stop or even slow it, so why should this year be any different? OK, then, how do we get the attention of students and parents? How about scaring them into believing the PHEE&IA will lead to immediate and massive tuition increases? Great, let's run with that!

How is this a winning strategy? All this talking point does is put UUP in a position to say, "We told you so" if the PHEE&IA passes and tuition increases are offset by state cuts. That's useful--not! What students, parents, and SUNY need are good reasons from UUP that the state should invest in public higher education, irrespective of whether the PHEE&IA passes. They need to understand that continued state support--in the form of salaries and benefits for SUNY employees to help keep SUNY affordable, as well as improved financial aid for students (including both grants and fairer access to cheaper credit) to help keep SUNY accessible--are necessary if the system is to avoid massive layoffs and/or the selling, closing, and merging of campuses. And that these investments in the mission of SUNY bring large and varied returns to the people and places of New York.

OK, next:

FACT: The legislation would eliminate state appropriations for tuition and other revenues, so there is no guarantee that student tuition and fees would be used to benefit students or the academic mission of the campus. Quality would suffer.

What is UUP really claiming here?

RED HERRING: Never mind that New York state already has used tuition dollars for non-educational purposes (i.e., to help close its massive budget deficits via the "tuition tax"), so that the current system, where student tuition is counted as state money, provides no guarantee of anything. Never mind that in the current system, where students and families pay the state rather than an individual campus, the state could find itself "forced" at any time by fiscal "necessities" to deny SUNY any or all of those dollars. And certainly never mind that specific language in both the bill and the comprehensive tuition policy draft circulated by SUNY System Administration four months before the PHEE&IA'S June 15th deadline to campuses, legislators, and the Board of Trustees for comment and improvement tie the use of tuition, fees, and other revenues directly to SUNY's mission. No, no, no--whatever you do, never assume that there's competent and responsible leadership at any level of the SUNY system. Actually, the only thing stopping SUNY from misusing your money are UUP and its friends in the legislature. So take our word that not only would the PHEE&IA end SUNY's affordability, it would also undermine SUNY's quality.

As I've already shown, this claim is based upon a tendentious misreading of language that's already in place and in effect in New York state education law and unchanged in the current bill. Don't take my word for it: go to S. 6607/A. 9707, Subpart A, Section 8, page 57, lines 12-24. Whatever the funding source, SUNY is obligated to create a budget in line with "its objects and purposes" and "under regulations prescribed by the state university trustees." The horror! The horror!!

OK, next:

FACT: SUNY could place a surcharge on tuition (differential tuition) that would vary by campus and program without limitation. Student access would be denied.

Sorry, Charlie! Try to keep up with the facts on the ground:

EX-FACT, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES: Let's pretend that SUNY has not responded to UUP's and others' critiques in its comprehensive tuition policy draft by giving up on program-specific differential tuition, closing the gap in the cap, changing the cap to a (still-to-be-determined) fixed annual percentage rate rather than a multiplier of the HEPI, clarifying the procedures and criteria for a campus to request a "special tuition rate," and incorporating specific language and policies to ensure student access. Conceding that would confuse students and families. Until the language of the PHEE&IA itself has been changed to prevent SUNY from arbitrarily changing its policy once the spotlight moves away, better to hit our one good talking point over and over and over, even if it's only technically possible for the worst to happen.

Actually, I can't blame UUP too much on this one. I want the language of the PHEE&IA changed to (a) take away the possibility of any of this coming back down the road and (b) require legislative approval of SUNY BOT tuition policy, including any future changes to it. While I believe it's better to acknowledge SUNY's improvements and directly call for language that would further improve the bill, I can understand that UUP wouldn't want to let its one effective talking point go to waste, simply because the facts on the ground have changed. I guess.

OK, next:

FACT: There's no evidence that public/private partnerships--especially those created without government oversight--raise revenue. In fact, SUNY's previous joint ventures have cost taxpayers millions.

Really? More like:

BACKPEDAL VIA WILD GUESS: Our original talking points expressing "serious reservations" due to "insufficient oversight" were too wishy-washy and wonky. So let's pretend that Phil Smith never wrote that "SUNY's previous experiences with joint ventures" were the result of "special bills enacted by the Legislature" (22 February 2010 letter to UUP members). Wouldn't be good to remind New Yorkers that even legislative oversight sometimes isn't enough, now, would it? No, no, better to imply that the "lost revenue" Smith wrote about in his letter to the membership is really wasted taxpayer dollars (rather than, say, private investments that didn't pan out). And pretend that past results guarantee future outcomes--"failure once, failure forever" is our motto. Let's call the whole thing off.

Yes, there have been problems with public/private partnerships in the past. The key question, then, is how to avoid them in the future. Minimizing the amount of and risk to taxpayer dollars is one obvious strategy. But instead of contributing further ideas, UUP hints that there is no solution, and can be none.

In short, the only thing UUP's ad convinces me of is that they either haven't seen SUNY's comprehensive tuition policy draft or wish they hadn't seen it. How could they have approved their ad in light of the following language from it?

Purpose of a Comprehensive Tuition Policy

The purpose of this policy is to ensure that tuition pricing for the State University of New York is fair, equitable and responsible by: 1. maintaining affordable access to the institution through a supplemental grant program, funded in part by a portion of tuition revenues; 2. tying tuition increases, if any, to predictable and incremental economic indicators, thus allowing students and their families to better manage the cost of pursuing a SUNY education; and 3. ensuring that SUNY fulfills its potential and responsibility as a driver of the State's economic growth through the reinvestment of all tuition revenues in the execution of SUNY's mission based strategic plan.

PHEE&IA is specifically designed to complement but not relieve the State of New York of its responsibility to support accessible and affordable public higher education. Appropriate levels of state funding, and SUNY's ability to control its own tuition policy, is the only method of ensuring that SUNY can reinvest all of its traditional tuition resources in the growth and development of its campuses, the development of SUNY Aid...and in terms of growing private philanthropic support.

Yeah, the language is rough, but it doesn't hurt my appetite or my digestion the way UUP's bad ad did. If there are any truth in advertising requirements for political ads, UUP is in a lot of trouble. In any case, floating a paper airplane that can be taken down by a few spitballs does little to bolster UUP's standing with the public or with legislators.

[Update 1 (3/8/10, 12:00 am): Where in Nancy Zimpher's latest op ed is the call to privatize SUNY? And why can't UUP's leadership sound more like the University of California at Berkeley's Wendy Brown?]

The Future of SUNY: Downsize, Reconfigure, or Grow?

A couple of days ago I expressed and explained my qualified support of the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act and summarized counterarguments offered by my colleagues and friends in the Fredonia University Senate. Even though I was actually incorporating into my argument critiques of key aspects of the bill by my faculty-professionals union, United University Professions, and essentially laying out a case for amending the bill so that it might gain their support, my colleagues worried about my focusing my rhetorical attacks on UUP President Phil Smith's position in my rationale for the resolution. Fair enough. Today, then, I'll take a look at SUNY's options going forward.

After all, there's no point in blaming SUNY's new administration for missing the "reset" button when it comes to labor-management relations. Chancellor Nancy Zimpher and her team have managed to hit it with every other major constituency within SUNY and across NY, but they must have listened to some truly awful advice when it comes to UUP. Instead of reaching out to UUP as partners in SUNY-wide strategic planning and potential co-authors of the Empowerment and Innovation Act (along with CUNY's Professional Staff Caucus)--which obviously would entail giving up control to gain legitimacy and a greater likelihood of achieving their goals--their strategy seems to have been to attempt to lobby UUP, and, when that failed, to attempt to neutralize them via a carrot-and-stick approach with their membership. If it doesn't work, they're in big trouble, having ended up pushing SUNY's faculty and professionals to embrace even the weak and short-sighted leadership of UUP and setting the stage for further and expanded opposition to any options they propose for dealing with the coming catastrophic cuts to SUNY in 2011-2012. But even if they end up winning this battle, they may end up losing the larger war.

This is because the Empowerment and Innovation Act is at best a delaying tactic and at worst a hedge against disaster. As Christopher Newfield has shown in Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class, market substitutes for general development don't offer a long-term solution to the long-term and accelerating erosion of state support for public higher education--particularly in New York, with its long history of favoring private colleges and universities, as documented by the collection co-edited by SUNY University Faculty Senate Chair Ken O'Brien, SUNY at 60: The Promise of the State University of New York. Now, Newfield's analysis is largely based on what's been going on in California, so although it does have national implications, there's always the chance that SUNY can learn from the University of California's mistakes. But even in that best-case scenario, it's going to take some time for new revenue streams for campuses to really start flowing. But the massive cuts to SUNY that seem unavoidable in the absence of new federal aid or renewed state support are a ticking time bomb set to explode so soon that any revenue flows from the Empowerment Act will be vaporized.

So what to do? Whether or not SUNY gets the Empowerment Act, it's going to have to act if it wants any kind of sustainable future. The SUNY Strategic Plan shows some promise of convincing New York's citizens and taxpayers that they will get immediate and long-lasting returns from even modest investments in the SUNY system, but it takes time to persuade the people, much less get a thoroughly dysfunctional state political system to act for the general good, even with a clear mandate from the people. Most likely, then, SUNY is going to have to do something dramatic--and soon--to get the attention and win the trust of New York's citizens, taxpayers, and politicians. Let's consider the options:

Downsize

Zimpher, Rimai, and company could follow the lead of corporations in a downturn: force each campus in the SUNY system to lay lots of people off. If they're enlightened managers, they'll do everything they can to streamline administration, eliminate waste, and cut non-instructional staff. But the cuts are likely to be of such a large magnitude that each campus will have to put everything on the table, including retrenchments: the closing and merging of departments and the firing of tenured faculty that this makes possible.

Obviously this strategy has huge costs and long-term repercussions, most notably in the uprising this will start among faculty and staff, the battles with their unions, and the ill-will all this will engender. But it's conceivable that the campuses could emerge from this in a better, stronger position than when they started it. It's more likely, though, that downsizing would be but a prelude to the selling, closing, or merging of a good number of campuses within SUNY.

Reconfigure

So why not cut to the chase and seriously rethink SUNY's size and configuration from the start? Is New York well-served by a 64-campus state university? Why not shift to 4 doctorals, 4 specialized colleges, 8 university colleges, and 16 community colleges? Why not confront the state with the consequences of its long-term disinvestment in SUNY and propose a more rational, sustainable configuration for SUNY in the 21st century?

Well, the political firestorm this strategy would set off, within SUNY and across the state, would make the previous strategy's controversies look like a molehill. Morever, each campus in the SUNY system represents decades of investment. It's doubtful that buyers could be found to take over all the campuses that would be kicked off the SUNY island. New York state would lose a lot of educational capacity, not to mention infrastructure. But what's the alternative?

Grow

New York needs more higher education capacity, not less. Even with a declining population, the state could actually see a greater demand for higher education this century--all it takes is for the school system to do a better job of preparing more kids for college, the financial system to find better ways to help them pay for it, and the jobs system to find better ways to use their talents and skills. Sure, those are big ifs, but pretty soon the state and the nation are going to have to decide if we want to return to the first half of the twentieth century, when college was a luxury for the wealthy and privileged few, or whether we want to move forward and prepare the next generations to tackle the problems of this century.

Let's say we make the right call. What does SUNY need to do to lay the groundwork for expansion? I suggest that every decision from here on out be made in light of that question.

Start with taking advantage of economies of scale and system-wide efficiencies.

• Let's get serious about a SUNY-wide library and technological infrastructure. Every SUNY student and faculty member should have the same access to the same set of books, journals, and databases.
• Same goes for textbook purchases. SUNY could use the power of bulk purchasing to drive down the costs of textbooks for its students.
• We need a SUNY-wide endowment. Let campuses continue to ramp up their fundraising efforts, but have them deposit their accounts into a SUNY-wide fund, run by a single set of top-notch money managers. Develop a formula for sending back to the campuses more than they would have earned by managing their own funds.

That's just a preliminary list, of course. The other side of the coin is campus-level flexibility. The billion-dollar question here is: how do we run the system so that private colleges and universities would want to join it? The point is to first bring in struggling private universities, then good ones, and finally great ones. With each new campus added to the system, the overall SUNY-wide endowment grows--and grows faster. The state can focus on supporting infrastructure, enhancing student financial aid, and making modest contributions to campus operating budgets. Even $1000/student would offer big returns to the state--not least in revenues from a progressive taxation system that would require those who have benefitted the most from their higher education to give back to their fellow citizens who didn't choose to enter it but who helped make their own education possible. If this is handled right, why wouldn't every college or university in the state eventually clamor to become part of the SUNY system?

[Update 1 (6:04 pm): A friend and colleague sent me the following via email:

Am I reading your blog correctly?

"If they're enlightened managers, they'll do everything they can to streamline administration, eliminate waste, and cut non-instructional staff."

I am truly saddened to read the end of this sentence--the Fredonia non-instructional staff keeps the buildings in good order, offers services to students, helps to promote the university and raise funds for programs that the state doesn’t provide for, keeps the residence halls in good order and provides student programming, handles purchasing and creates paychecks, etc. In fact, the university could not operate without its non-instructional staff. Perhaps I’ve misunderstood--if that’s the case, then please clarify.

The perils of writing quickly. Obviously, any university needs non-instructional staff. No enlightened manager should take the position that "no member of the teaching faculty should be let go while a single non-instructional staff member remains on the payroll." So I should have written "cut non-essential non-instructional staff." But to put that line in context, keep in mind I was arguing that once a campus deficit gets large enough, everyone's position is potentially on the chopping block, even those of tenured faculty. And I was making that point to suggest that "downsizing" was a bad option, step one of my larger argument that growing SUNY via bringing privates (and their endowments) into the fold is the best short- and long-term solution to making public higher education sustainable in the 21st century.]

Dear Phil...

The governance bodies and leaders of the State University of New York have been in an interesting position for most of this year. In one sense, we're being courted by SUNY Chancellor Nancy Zimpher and UUP President Phil Smith, who have taken opposing positions on Governor Paterson's Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act. In another sense, we're the staging ground on which duelling talking points are being fired back and forth. And in yet another sense, we're one battleground for the ground war currently being fought to determine who really speaks for the faculty and students in the SUNY system, a counterpart to the air war (TV, radio) and cyberwar (SUNY, SaveSUNY.org). That's the background for this unofficial open letter to Phil Smith, explaining why I'm bringing to the SUNY Fredonia University Senate a special budget resolution that asks us to express our qualified support for the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act.

[Update 1 (3/3/10, 7:36 am): Here's my sequel to this post, looking more broadly at SUNY's future, whether or not the Empowerment Act becomes law this year.]

[Update 2 (3/17/10, 9:55 am): Glad to see that this page is still generating so much traffic an entire bloggy era after its first posting, but would encourage people interested in these issues to start with my most recent post (directed at Ken O'Brien, Nancy Zimpher, and Monica Rimai) and work their way backwards.]

Dear Phil,

I was at the UUP Delegate Assembly earlier this month and have received your letter of 22 February 2010 to the UUP membership, so I think I have a pretty good understanding of where you and UUP stand on the Empowerment and Innovation Act, or, as you like to call it, the "Endangerment and Injury Act." I understand that there are some problems--some major, some minor--with the bill as proposed by Governor Paterson, and I appreciate your due diligence in uncovering and publicizing them. And I understand that you need to send a clear message to Chancellor Zimpher that there are consequences to treating UUP as a special interest to be won over, instead of as a trusted partner to be consulted and a respected adversary to be negotiated with before and as a bill is being crafted.

But as Fredonia's campus governance leader, I have a responsibility to represent all the faculty at SUNY Fredonia. And I can't join you in simply opposing the act. So in a few hours I'm going to be arguing before the SUNY Fredonia University Senate that they ought to pass the following special budget resolution:

Whereas over the past 24 months, SUNY state-operated campuses have been cut by $562 million dollars, so that major disruptions in the ability of New York's largest public higher education system to offer students a quality, affordable education are imminent;

Whereas after accounting for additional tuition revenues, SUNY Fredonia still faces a projected operating deficit in excess of $5 million for 2010-11;

Whereas the projected deficit for 2011-12 is likely to be much higher, due to the end of federal stimulus support to New York’s state budget;

Whereas it is imperative that every major public higher education organization work together to present a united front to address the long-standing and accelerating erosion of state funding for public higher education;

Whereas the Governor's Office and the SUNY system have designed the New York State Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act to (1) depoliticize tuition, (2) eliminate the current "tax on tuition," (3) eliminate unnecessary duplication of contract pre-approvals, and (4) provide for a streamlined mechanism to receive gubernatorial and legislative approval for public-private partnerships and any associated land leases;

Therefore, be it resolved that the SUNY Fredonia University Senate direct the Executive Committee to craft, send, and post open letters to key legislative leaders and higher education organizations expressing and explaining our qualified support for the major provisions within the Public Higher Education Empowerment Act;

Be it further resolved that the SUNY Fredonia University Senate direct its Chair to work with the presidents of the local UUP chapter and the Student Association to jointly craft a statement of conditions under which we all would support a Public Higher Education Empowerment Act;

And, be it finally resolved that the SUNY Fredonia University Senate direct its Chair to seek guidance, input, and feedback from across and beyond the campus on what principles ought to underlie the meaning, mission, value, and financing of public higher education in the twenty-first century and present a plan to the Planning and Budget Advisory Committee for revision, endorsement, and submission to the University Senate during the 2010-11 academic year.

Why should my colleagues support this resolution and go against your position? Let me list the reasons:

(1) The unprecedented scale of the budget deficits facing the State of New York and the sharp and lasting decline in state revenues. Without the kinds of reforms and initiatives proposed by New Yorkers for Fiscal Fairness, we worry that the $562M in actual and proposed cuts to SUNY over the last 2 years--roughly equal to 25% of SUNY's operating budget, as you yourself noted at the DA--will pale in comparison to the coming cuts. In an earlier draft of this resolution, I suggested that these cuts will go far beyond fat-trimming, even beyond muscle and bone, to threaten the imminent dismemberment of the SUNY system itself.

In the face of this threat, which goes far beyond layoffs and even retrenchments to the selling of certain campuses, the closing of others, and the merger of others, what's really so bad about ending the accounting trick that treats actual tuition paid by students and their families as "state revenue," ending the state's taking of emergency tuition increases (a "tuition tax" that amounts to roughly 10% of what Fredonia students pay each year), and taking SUNY tuition policy out of the hands of politicians concerned mainly with reelection and putting it in the hands of campus leaders, who must seek approval from the Chancellor's Office and the Board of Trustees for any tuition increases, after first winning the support of local students and trustees? Such proposals should be part of the campus governance process, as well, and I will communicate what we at Fredonia support to the appropriate higher education and state government leaders if the Senate gives me that authority.

So long as the cap on tuition is firm and at a fixed percentage rate (rather than a multiple of HEPI), so long as campus and SUNY leaders craft good policies and develop smart strategies, so long as a campus/program tuition rate is guaranteed for 4 years for each entering class, what's the real problem with rational and differential tuition? Repeatedly you've argued that the act unduly shifts the burden of financing SUNY from the state to students, but what's stopping the state and federal government from investing further in SUNY and/or expanding student financial aid when the economy turns around?

You've also argued that the bill "removes any guarantee that student tuition and fees will be restricted to benefitting the academic mission of your campus" (2/22/10 letter, page 2). But hasn't that already been happening with the tax on tuition? And haven't state appropriations as well as tuition and fees always been "used for expenses of the state university in carrying out any of its objects and purposes...under regulations prescribed by the state university system" (Subpart A, Section 3, page 58, lines 21-24)? This language is unchanged in the current bill; what changes is who controls the fund and where it is located, but semi-annual reporting language to the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee is also added in, for additional legislative oversight (Subpart A, Section 7, page 59, line 31 to page 60, line 6). How does this entail "removing" oversight? Looks more like shifting and redefining oversight responsibilities to me.

So it seems to me that your deepest reason for opposing the tuition portions of the bill has to do with the perceived threat to UUP itself. But you are asking us to ignore the following language:

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, all rights and benefits, including terms and conditions of employment, and protection of civil service and collective bargaining status of all employees of the state university affected by the provisions of the New York state public higher education empowerment and innovation act, shall be preserved and protected. Incumbents of any newly created positions within the state university shall be considered public employees for all purposes of article fourteen of the civil service law. (Subpart A, Section 12, page 62, lines 5-12)

This doesn't sound like a frontal, or even a hidden, attack on the Taylor Law to me. Your read of the "University's intent" in your letter of 22 February--to "undo union contracts"--is based solely on the remarks of certain unnamed campus presidents, rather than the text of the bill itself. As for the supposed desire on the part of the SUNY administration to break up and break down the state-wide UUP, isn't that actually dependent on the actions of our "friends" in the legislature? Isn't what you're really telling us that we can't trust the state to honor its commitments to the mission of SUNY, whether or not the bill passes? In that case, isn't it more prudent to support it, as an insurance policy against precisely that eventuality?

(2) The energy, passion, intelligence, grit, and commitment to public higher education and shared governance consistently demonstrated by Chancellor Zimpher and her administrative team. During Chancellor Zimpher's visit to Fredonia, in a private meeting with campus governance leaders, I asked her flat out if she wanted to be known as the Chancellor who dismantled SUNY. I pressed her on her vision for public higher education in the 21st century and her response to the slow-motion privatization of SUNY. I did the same for Chief Operating Officer Monica Rimai at the UFS plenary in Cobleskill, both publicly and privately. I came away from those conversations convinced that we finally have smart and strong leadership in SUNY System Administration. But don't take my word for them. I'm probably an overly-trusting person. Let's review some facts.

Consider that although the bill requires a SUNY tuition-enrollment policy by 15 June, using criteria including, but not limited to,

program cost, program mix, need, comparison with peer programs or campuses, economic elasticity, impact on access, fairness and measures to ensure that students are not steered toward certain courses of study based on ability to pay (A.9707/S.6607, Subpart A, Section 1, page 56, lines 20-24)

to evaluate campus requests for tuition increases, Zimpher and Rimai have already circulated a draft to the State Senate's Higher Education Committee as of 24 February and expressed their openness to revisions at the committee's suggestion. This speaks volumes to their competence, transparency, and flexibility. Consider that Cornell's Ron Ehrenberg is being fast-tracked to join the SUNY Board of Trustees. [Update (3/4/10): He was just confirmed by the NYS Senate!] Consider that the Rockefeller Institute report that Chancellor Zimpher commissioned in response to the Comptroller's Office's misguided proposals on non-resident tuition was rigorous, comprehensive, and nuanced. Consider that amendments have already been proposed to the bill in Assembly and as of 17 February were sent back to the Ways and Means Committee. Finally, consider that SUNY's strategic planning echoes, builds upon, and expands upon UUP's own studies of the huge economic impact of state investment in SUNY and seeks to tie the fortunes of SUNY to P-12 public education.

In response, you've attacked public-private partnerships as wasters of taxpayer dollars. You claim that "SUNY's previous experiences with joint ventures, through special bills enacted by the Legislature, have cost New York taxpayers millions of dollars in lost revenue" (2/22/10 letter) and if I heard right at the DA, you suggested the figure was on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. But how much state money is really being lost? Do you know how much it cost the state to fund SUNY's Fredonia's new incubator? One dollar. [Update (3/4/10): That's in operating costs; state money was part of many sources of funding during the construction phase.  My point is that SUNY can learn from others' mistakes and identify best practices when setting up criteria for approving campus requests.]

How about land leases? Let's look to the text of the bill itself, which states that any such leases authorized by the Board of Trustees must be "in support of the educational and other corporate purposes of the state university, unless the subject project is in conflict with the mission of the campus to which it relates" (Subpart B, Section 1, page 63, lines 38-43); furthermore, "nothing in the lease or agreement shall be deemed to waive or impair any rights or benefits of employees of the state university of New York that would otherwise be available to them pursuant to the terms of collective bargaining agreements. All work performed on the demised premises that ordinarily be performed by employees subject to article fourteen of the civil service law shall continue to be performed by such employees" (Subpart B, Section 1, page 64, lines 9-15). This is the threat to SUNY's mission and our jobs?

As for streamlining the contract pre-approval process, this doesn't have to make it more difficult for us to stop outsourcing or protect employee rights. The state comptroller and attorney general are not removed from the review process in the state university asset maximization board--they are ex officio members, joined by non-voting members recommended by the minority leaders of the Senate and Assembly (cf. Subpart B, Section 2, page 65, lines 26-35). I don't see why they all couldn't be made voting members, or that the 4 legislative members couldn't be appointed by their respective houses rather than by the Governor. What's important is that campuses would no longer have to waste time and resources lobbying their local and other legislative leaders (with the risk of gubernatorial veto by mistake, as happened recently to SUNY Purchase), that once they passed the hurdle of System and BOT review, they would get a thumbs up or thumbs down in 45 days. At Fredonia, during the 10 months the comptroller made us wait for approval of our University Commons construction contract, materials costs went up so fast they cost us nearly another $1M. Oh, and by the way, we've never had a request denied, only delayed.

I agree with you that worker protections need to be strengthened--there are some nasty requirements of 30% union representation in particular trades and occupations hidden in the prevailing wages language; leaving "procurement guidelines" to be "annually adopted by the fund trustees" is too open-ended (cf. Subpart B, Section 4, page 66, line 44 to page 67, line 11); and I don't like the project labor agreement or binding arbitration provisions, either--and that "construction projects performed by private contractors using private funds are exempt" from even these labor protections. But again, this seems worth amending rather than opposing.

Finally, on tuition again, why haven't you acknowledged that most other states already do what the bill proposes for New York? Or that New York's own community colleges have had a differential tuition policy for years? Or that the Board of Trustees has stuck by its policy to keep fee increases under the HEPI cap for close to a decade? What has been the experience under these regimes, here and elsewhere? We agree that SUNY should strive to keep undergraduate tuition as low as possible, so that New York may keep its public higher education system affordable and accessible, but what about quality? If the state won't invest in quality, but finds itself forced into cuts of such magnitude that they threaten the current size and configuration of the entire SUNY system, just what are we to do?

Bottom line: why go to war with potential new allies in SUNY System Administration? Why insinuate that neither campus--administrators, campus governance, student government, and your own local chapters--nor state-wide leadership can be trusted with the responsibility the bill gives them? Rather than distract and confuse the legislature with opposition to the bill, wouldn't it have been better to put conditions on your support for it and negotiate with SUNY and legislative leaders, so that everyone involved may focus on the primary mission--figuring out how to make New York state invest in public higher education? Anyone who thinks this bill can simply substitute for state investment had better read Christopher Newfield's Unmaking the Public University. Where is the New York-based version of that California-centric study?

(3) The relative ineffectiveness of UUP's tireless and long-standing advocacy efforts and overall lack of any proactive planning or strategizing from UUP since Rethinking SUNY.

It seems to me that your opposition to the bill is mainly a stalling tactic. It might well be possible to outwait Governor Paterson, but where is the planning to influence any future governor or legislators? To prepare for a range of budgetary scenarios in coming years, up to and including state meltdown and budget apocalypse? In the absence of such planning, you seem to expect academics to be persuaded by straw-man and slippery-slope arguments. You seem to expect us to be stampeded by fear-mongering and worst-case scenarios. The legitimate problems with the bill that you've helped uncover provide arguments for improving it, not killing it. But when you liken the bill to a "wolf in sheep's clothing" without strong supporting arguments to explain and justify your analysis, you come across as the boy who cried wolf.

Phil, the basic problem is that you've made clear what you oppose but nobody knows what you're for. What is your plan to save SUNY? What are you doing to influence SUNY's strategic plan, to get a seat at the table when the time comes to draft and revise it--or, better yet, to help develop and articulate UUP's own vision for public higher education in the twenty-first century? Will you remain in reactive mode, as the union has been in since the Scheuerman era? Or will you finally shift UUP from a business unionism model to a social justice model?

I'll let you know the results of our meeting later this afternoon. But whether or not you hear from me again in language that's been approved by the Executive Committee of the SUNY Fredonia University Senate, I eagerly await your response and I encourage you to check back in for future posts on this subject.

Sincerely,



Bruce N. Simon
Associate Professor of English
Chair, SUNY Fredonia University Senate