Picking up my girls from day care in 15 minutes from the time I started writing this, so here's my rapid-fire response to the New York State Senate's Budget Resolution.
What I Like
1. The call for a statutory change that would allow SUNY to receive and retain all tuition revenue, even if it is via state appropriation.
2. The elimination of the tax on tuition.
3. Allowing the BOT to establish a rational tuition policy, with a cap at 1.5 times the five-year rolling HEPI average: #1-#3 help the comprehensives, which are very tuition-dependent.
4. The rejection of a cap on out-of-state enrollment: this seemed unfair to non-residents and xenophobic when it comes to international students; NY and American students ought to learn about taking college seriously by competing with students from other states and countries who choose to enroll in SUNY; moreover, many of them might decide to live and work in NY after graduation.
What I Don't Care About
1. The rejection of land-lease authority to the BOT, as approved by a new SUNY Asset Maximization Board: didn't really matter much out here in Western NY, anyway.
2. Only allowing the shift to a post-audit system for the procurement of goods: hey, if the state Senate wants to waste taxpayer money, that's their call.
3. Hitting SUNY System Administration with a $5.5M cut: drop in the bucket that looks like payback for daring to challenge legislative control.
What I Hate
1. The privileging of UB and Stony Brook when it comes to setting a campus-wide differential tuition rate: why identify 2 flagships that'll now most likely move to the high-tuition/high-aid model and screw over the other 32 state-operated campuses? The only way this helps the other 32 is if state support remains constant and what would have gone to those 2 schools gets spread throughout the system.
2. Allowing differential tuition by program and campus only for out-of-state undergraduate and graduate/professional students: everywhere else, limiting special tuition rates to a small pool of students guarantees most campuses will receive very little actual benefit from the work involved in determining the special rate. Plus, it's unfair to those groups of students.
More later!
[Update 1 (7:52 pm): And of course the biggest thing I hate about the Senate's budget resolution is its support of the Governor's cuts to SUNY! Looks like the state senate is getting the chainsaw ready for 2011-2012, while putting a dollop of whipped cream on a bread-and-water diet for the vast majority of 4-year institutions in SUNY as a special treat while we languish in the state budget dungeon.]
Monday, March 22, 2010
What Can New York Learn from Michigan and California When It Comes to Public Higher Ed?
In Unmaking the Public University (2009), Christopher Newfield takes a careful look at the fortunes of the University of Michigan and University of California as they have responded to "declining public money" by "increasing private funds" (174). He takes direct aim at the failure of Robert Zemsky, Gregory Wegner, and William Massy's Remaking the Public University (2005) to provide evidence of a "causal relationship between 'going to market' and new revenues" (175). Since this is the fundamental ground of dispute between the leadership of SUNY and UUP over New York's Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act, it would make a big difference whether Newfield's analysis proves that it is structurally impossible for the PHEE&IA to produce new revenues for SUNY or simply identifies problems to avoid. Today, I'll follow up on my earlier response to Newfield by arguing that Unmaking the University actually supports the latter view.
I'll start by focusing on Newfield's attempts to rebut Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy's portrayal as a success story of the University of Michigan's strategy to "diversify its income sources" in response to a "deindustrializing state economy and falling tax revenues in the early 1980s" via "increas[ing] private fund-raising, continuously rais[ing] tuition, and support[ing] entrepreneurial faculty members in their quest for larger shares of both federal money and industry sponsorship" (174). To do that, Newfield points out that
I'll hit the high points for you via reference to both:
Even more prescient, however, was the worst-case scenario that the study contemplated, which it called the "Public Funding Freeze" model. What does it entail?
In this situation, "the public spends half the share of its income on UC tha[n] it had a decade earlier (down to 0.15% of per capita personal income by 2011)" (UBU 187; cf. CBT 29 for the summary table). The report's executive summary explains the ramifications of such a freeze:
Newfield's commentary in Unmaking the Public University says it all: "The outcome would be something like what Michigan, New York, and Texas have now: systems where relatively poor and academically struggling institutions coexist with one or two research flagships in a ph[]ase stratification" (189).
In other words, following the UM model would mean that California would move from a situation where all eligible high school graduates could attend a public research flagship to 84% of them making do with "the more limited opportunities of a regional state college" (189). This would entail "major economic and sociocultural losses" (190):
Newfield argues plausibly that what the majority of students gain at research universities via exposure to "both the results of advanced research and the process through which research creates knowledge" (190) and from the resulting "practices of intellectual independence" (191) are "more developed capacities to innovate and restructure systems on an ongoing basis" (192). But for a public university to successfully combine the quality of teaching at small liberal arts colleges with the exposure to advanced research methods and results of Ivy League universities, it needs significant state support for such an expensive and labor-intensive endeavor. When that support is withdrawn, "faculty are not hired or replaced, more teaching is done with less expensive lecturers and teaching assistants, class size is increased, and classes are dropped" (192). Private giving, by contrast, "is almost always restricted, and goes to targeted research, sports, trademark-building projects, and the special interests of donors" (192):
In both his co-authored study and book, then, Newfield has built a strong case that core university operations--high-quality mass teaching and research--couldn't be well-supported across the UC system in a budget freeze, even were tuition to be raised to $15K per year for in-state students.
Now, in showing that Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy are wrong to accept both "the shift from general public funding to a 'user fee' model in which students and their families pay privately for their education" and the notion that "higher education [should seek to] replace[s] lost public funding with higher user fees" (175), Newfield does leave himself some wiggle room when he acknowledges that "[i]ncreasing 'user fees' is a traditional strategy that is fully compatible with public funding and does not in itself signal a new adaptation to market forces" (176). Sure, it's an effective critique of Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy's choice of UM as a key supporting example--rather than being both "market-smart" and "mission-centered," Newfield's analysis suggests that it is neither--but it also allows him to implicitly accept the existence of some tuition at public universities. If it is invested directly into enhancements of teaching and research, if it augments a firm base of public support for core operations, and if it remains low enough to not act as a barrier to student access, then some tuition is justifiable.
But how to identify what a firm base of public support for public higher education ought to be? Newfield's analysis suggests that we track the following measures in New York over long periods of time:
Unfortunately, I haven't been able to track down my favorite figure, the 4th on the above list. Knowing SUNY's share of NY per capita income would be the best way of comparing levels across the region and the country.
Some of this data is publicly available, though. From the Grapevine study I linked to above, I found out that I'm paying a little bit more than the state average into the SUNY system this academic year. But even if I broke into six figures (and I'm not even close), my total commitment to SUNY via taxes would be just over $525 per $100K. That's a lot more than I donate to Hamilton College each year (Princeton doesn't need my money). Restoring progressivity to NY's tax system would allow those who benefitted the most from their own higher education to contribute their fair share to provide opportunities for the next generation--and an incentive to reduce their taxes via private giving to higher ed.
In addition, SUNY has been sharing some of this data with state-wide and campus governance leaders. Assuming they're using the same calculations as Newfield for "core operations," the level of state support for SUNY core operations is comparable to his figures. General fund support bounced around in the high 60% and low 70% range in the early '90s, declined sharply into the low 60% range in the late '90s, climbed into the mid-60% range for the first 3 years of the 2000s, plunged sharply again for the next 3 years into the mid-50% range, recovered for the next 3 years into the high 50% and low 60% range, and then dropped sharply again this academic year to near 50%. But all signs suggest that 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 will see us fall into the low-to-mid 40% range. So in a sense UC's fortunes could be understood as the "canary in the mineshaft" for SUNY. While both systems suffered large cuts in 1995 and 2003, SUNY managed to keep significantly more state support for core operations. But we're approaching where UC was back in 2005-2006.
It's worth noting, however, that university colleges like my own institution have been bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of declining state support within the SUNY system. The average share of state support for the comprehensives tends to lag about 15 percentage points behind the doctorates in SUNY. Whereas the doctorates have fallen from the high 50% range to the low 50% range in the last 3 academic years, the comprehensives have declined from the mid-40% range to the mid-30% range. And in fact at SUNY Fredonia, the state's share will fall below 20% for next academic year if the Governor's cuts go through. This is because we gain revenue not only from student tuition and fees (along with a relatively low level of financial aid compared to our peer institutions in SUNY), but also from residence halls, food services, and the campus bookstore. It's often quoted that our Faculty Student Association's activities generate more revenue for the campus than does state support. I wouldn't be surprised if the average regular at our campus Starbucks (a franchise run by our FSA) spends more in a year than she is taxed by the state to support SUNY Fredonia.
And that trend is likely to accelerate here and across the state in the next several years, whether or not the PHEE&IA passes. If it does go down in flames, students are likely to see a much higher tuition increase than they otherwise would have gotten. If they think they have a better chance of influencing New York's dysfunctional political system than their local campus leadership, more power to them. They'll need it.
We'll all need it, in fact. We'll need a range of tactics and a concerted effort to craft an overall strategy to bring the figures Newfield suggests we track back to equitable and sustainable levels.
I'll start by focusing on Newfield's attempts to rebut Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy's portrayal as a success story of the University of Michigan's strategy to "diversify its income sources" in response to a "deindustrializing state economy and falling tax revenues in the early 1980s" via "increas[ing] private fund-raising, continuously rais[ing] tuition, and support[ing] entrepreneurial faculty members in their quest for larger shares of both federal money and industry sponsorship" (174). To do that, Newfield points out that
- UM was a "principal beneficiary" of a boom in public research funding from the early 1980s through the mid-2000s, sparked by federal research money for the health sciences, which is one of UM's areas of great strength (175);
- even though UM already had a strong fundraising operation and the largest alumni base in the nation, its "receipts did not outpace philanthropic growth for American universities as a whole" (176);
- even though UM raised tuition and the percentage of out-of-state students in each entering class sharply and often, "much of these revenues replaced lost state funding rather than offered new money" (176); and
- UM's rank in "U.S. News & World Report's infamous reputational survey" declined from 8th in 1987 to 25th in 2003; its selectivity did not improve; with so many out-of-state students in the system and especially at Ann Arbor, UM failed to advance its original mission of "educating the population of Michigan itself" (which is "well below the national average in the percentage of the state's population that receives bachelor's or advanced degrees"); its share of African-American students declined so sharply that even after years of improvements, its 2005 freshman class's proportion of Africans Americans was about half the state's; and its share of students from lower-income families as measured by the percentage of students with Pell Grants was about half of UC Santa Barbara's (176).
I'll hit the high points for you via reference to both:
- their report confirmed UC's own data (in which UC's share of California's general fund declined from 7% in 1970-1971 to 3.1% in 2006-2007) with "a dismal tale of an overall trend of declining education funding in a state with one of the largest concentrations of wealthy individuals and industries in the world," buttressed by such measures as "declining state share of 'UC Core Funds' (down to 45% around 2005 from 60% in 2001), and the state's declining contribution measured as a share of personal income" (UPU 185; cf. CBT 6 for a great chart that illustrates that state support for "that portion of the campus budgets that are directly concerned with the everyday educational mission" has declined from a peak above 75% in 1985-1986, to around 60% in both 1991-1992 and 2001-2002, to around 45% in 2005-2006; cf. CBT 18 for a chart that compares projected state support of "UC Core Funds" under the Compact to a restoration of 2001-2002 levels; cf. CBT 7 for UC's share of CA's general fund charted from 1985-2006; and cf. CBT 8 and 13 for UC's share of state personal income from 1985-2006, which declined from a high of near .38% in 1987 to near .20% in 2006);
- their report projected that the May 2004 "Higher Education Compact" among UC, California State University, and the governor of California, would leave the UC system in 2010-2011 "about $1.2B a year behind its extrapolated 2001 funding level, and twice as much behind its extrapolated 1990 funding level (on a base of about $3.3B in state general fund money in 2001)" (UPU 185-186);
- their report projected that under the Compact state funding per student would decline from a little over $13K in 2001-2002 to a little under $10K in 2010-2011 (UPU 186; cf. CBT 18-19 for more detail); and
- their report noted that using private philanthropy to replace the lost state support under the Compact would require UC to raise $30B in new funding for its endowment--that is, pass Harvard within 5 years (CBT 22-23).
Even more prescient, however, was the worst-case scenario that the study contemplated, which it called the "Public Funding Freeze" model. What does it entail?
Another downturn in state finances and continued political opposition to tax increases prompts state and University leaders to reluctantly concede that it would be better to conduct an organized shift away from public funding than to suffer further uncertainty amidst a new cycle of budget crises. They decide to become a "state-assisted university" and to "privatize" centrally and systematically. State leaders agree to cap the General Fund at 2005-2006 levels (in nominal dollars), to allow the General Fund share to decline to 15% of the university's budget (or about 1/3 of the "core") by the end of 2010-2011. (CBT 29)
In this situation, "the public spends half the share of its income on UC tha[n] it had a decade earlier (down to 0.15% of per capita personal income by 2011)" (UBU 187; cf. CBT 29 for the summary table). The report's executive summary explains the ramifications of such a freeze:
The state continues to carry a structural deficit, remains politically polarized, has expensive needs in health and human services, and awaits new budgetary surprises such as unfunded health care obligations for retired state employees. These problems may encourage some to move UC toward a "high-tuition/high-aid" model in tandem with aggressive private fundraising, increased industry partnerships, and expanded sales and services. This fourth scenario, however, cannot actually be achieved with private fundraising: to obtain the billion dollars that will be lost by comparison with the Compact, and to obtain it in unrestricted payouts, the University would need to raise $25 billion in unrestricted gifts. To reach the 2001-02 funding level, more than $54 billion would be needed. Alternately, tuition increases big enough to fill the gap would shrink enrollments and, at the same time, reduce the quality of the university’s student body. The overall UC system would continue in name but not in reality, as the most prestigious campuses draw on a national student pool and collect large amounts of non-resident tuition while other campuses struggle with diminished resources, fewer programs, and reduced research capacity. Wasteful intercampus competition may arise, in part in the form of the budgetary fragmentation that the Master Plan had in its time brought to a close. Since undergraduate instruction is disproportionately dependent on the state General Fund, such changes would seriously damage the assumption of a high-quality curriculum for all qualified students. The Public Funding Freeze would end the UC system as we know it. (CBT 2; cf. 29-34 for the gory details)
Newfield's commentary in Unmaking the Public University says it all: "The outcome would be something like what Michigan, New York, and Texas have now: systems where relatively poor and academically struggling institutions coexist with one or two research flagships in a ph[]ase stratification" (189).
In other words, following the UM model would mean that California would move from a situation where all eligible high school graduates could attend a public research flagship to 84% of them making do with "the more limited opportunities of a regional state college" (189). This would entail "major economic and sociocultural losses" (190):
State colleges have fewer resources, offer less or little research, and generally place fewer of their students in positions of social or professional leadership. Students coming out of them have lower incomes than students from major research universities (public or private) and pay less in taxes back to the states that educated them. On average, state college graduates have more limited prospects. States that send a higher proportion of their public university students to regional rather than research universities have lower average incomes, and, we can infer, more socioeconomic stratification within their college-educated middle classes. (190)
Newfield argues plausibly that what the majority of students gain at research universities via exposure to "both the results of advanced research and the process through which research creates knowledge" (190) and from the resulting "practices of intellectual independence" (191) are "more developed capacities to innovate and restructure systems on an ongoing basis" (192). But for a public university to successfully combine the quality of teaching at small liberal arts colleges with the exposure to advanced research methods and results of Ivy League universities, it needs significant state support for such an expensive and labor-intensive endeavor. When that support is withdrawn, "faculty are not hired or replaced, more teaching is done with less expensive lecturers and teaching assistants, class size is increased, and classes are dropped" (192). Private giving, by contrast, "is almost always restricted, and goes to targeted research, sports, trademark-building projects, and the special interests of donors" (192):
Private funding does not come in sufficient supply to support core operations: teaching lower-division courses, writing tutorials, calculus and bench laboratory experience, language instruction, seminar interaction, independent study, and well-staffed large lectures in which students continue to get adequate personal attention. Personal attention is the core element of high-quality mass higher education: the brilliant top will do fine on its own, but the other 95%--with plenty of potential but less experience, training, entitlement, and confidence--need the kind of highly developed teaching infrastructure that costs serious money. (193-194)
In both his co-authored study and book, then, Newfield has built a strong case that core university operations--high-quality mass teaching and research--couldn't be well-supported across the UC system in a budget freeze, even were tuition to be raised to $15K per year for in-state students.
Now, in showing that Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy are wrong to accept both "the shift from general public funding to a 'user fee' model in which students and their families pay privately for their education" and the notion that "higher education [should seek to] replace[s] lost public funding with higher user fees" (175), Newfield does leave himself some wiggle room when he acknowledges that "[i]ncreasing 'user fees' is a traditional strategy that is fully compatible with public funding and does not in itself signal a new adaptation to market forces" (176). Sure, it's an effective critique of Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy's choice of UM as a key supporting example--rather than being both "market-smart" and "mission-centered," Newfield's analysis suggests that it is neither--but it also allows him to implicitly accept the existence of some tuition at public universities. If it is invested directly into enhancements of teaching and research, if it augments a firm base of public support for core operations, and if it remains low enough to not act as a barrier to student access, then some tuition is justifiable.
But how to identify what a firm base of public support for public higher education ought to be? Newfield's analysis suggests that we track the following measures in New York over long periods of time:
- SUNY share of NY's general fund
- NY general fund share of SUNY's operating budget
- NY general fund share of SUNY's core operations
- SUNY share of per capita personal income in NY
- per capita personal income in NY invested in SUNY
- amount per $1000 in personal income in NY invested in SUNY
Unfortunately, I haven't been able to track down my favorite figure, the 4th on the above list. Knowing SUNY's share of NY per capita income would be the best way of comparing levels across the region and the country.
Some of this data is publicly available, though. From the Grapevine study I linked to above, I found out that I'm paying a little bit more than the state average into the SUNY system this academic year. But even if I broke into six figures (and I'm not even close), my total commitment to SUNY via taxes would be just over $525 per $100K. That's a lot more than I donate to Hamilton College each year (Princeton doesn't need my money). Restoring progressivity to NY's tax system would allow those who benefitted the most from their own higher education to contribute their fair share to provide opportunities for the next generation--and an incentive to reduce their taxes via private giving to higher ed.
In addition, SUNY has been sharing some of this data with state-wide and campus governance leaders. Assuming they're using the same calculations as Newfield for "core operations," the level of state support for SUNY core operations is comparable to his figures. General fund support bounced around in the high 60% and low 70% range in the early '90s, declined sharply into the low 60% range in the late '90s, climbed into the mid-60% range for the first 3 years of the 2000s, plunged sharply again for the next 3 years into the mid-50% range, recovered for the next 3 years into the high 50% and low 60% range, and then dropped sharply again this academic year to near 50%. But all signs suggest that 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 will see us fall into the low-to-mid 40% range. So in a sense UC's fortunes could be understood as the "canary in the mineshaft" for SUNY. While both systems suffered large cuts in 1995 and 2003, SUNY managed to keep significantly more state support for core operations. But we're approaching where UC was back in 2005-2006.
It's worth noting, however, that university colleges like my own institution have been bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of declining state support within the SUNY system. The average share of state support for the comprehensives tends to lag about 15 percentage points behind the doctorates in SUNY. Whereas the doctorates have fallen from the high 50% range to the low 50% range in the last 3 academic years, the comprehensives have declined from the mid-40% range to the mid-30% range. And in fact at SUNY Fredonia, the state's share will fall below 20% for next academic year if the Governor's cuts go through. This is because we gain revenue not only from student tuition and fees (along with a relatively low level of financial aid compared to our peer institutions in SUNY), but also from residence halls, food services, and the campus bookstore. It's often quoted that our Faculty Student Association's activities generate more revenue for the campus than does state support. I wouldn't be surprised if the average regular at our campus Starbucks (a franchise run by our FSA) spends more in a year than she is taxed by the state to support SUNY Fredonia.
And that trend is likely to accelerate here and across the state in the next several years, whether or not the PHEE&IA passes. If it does go down in flames, students are likely to see a much higher tuition increase than they otherwise would have gotten. If they think they have a better chance of influencing New York's dysfunctional political system than their local campus leadership, more power to them. They'll need it.
We'll all need it, in fact. We'll need a range of tactics and a concerted effort to craft an overall strategy to bring the figures Newfield suggests we track back to equitable and sustainable levels.
Sunday, March 21, 2010
Are You There, Albany? It's Me, the Constructivist; or, An Outline of a Political Settlement on the Empowerment Act
All right, enough with the despair over the prospects of passing the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act (PHEE&IA). Even if it's quickly getting to the point where serious cooperation between the leaders of organizations representing almost the full range of SUNY constituencies can make little if any impact on the legislative process, there's still a lot that can happen as the budget bill is finalized. If the rumors I'm hearing are true that it's going to be rushed through, here are the outlines of a compromise that the infamous "3 men in a room" in Albany can understand, and perhaps sign off on.
It's pretty clear that the PHEE&IA sidelines the state legislature while keeping the Governor firmly in charge of SUNY. After all, the legislature would have to give up control over SUNY's tuition were the bill to become law, but nothing in it changes the fact that SUNY counts as a state agency (and so is subject to unilateral funding cuts from the Governor), or that the Governor appoints the SUNY Board of Trustees, the initiates the budget-setting process for SUNY (via the Division of Budget), and negotiates with the unions representing SUNY employees (via the Governor's Office of Employee Relations). Even when the bill appears to include the state Senate and Assembly, the Governor retains control. For instance, the State University Asset Maximization Review Board it creates is appointed solely by the Governor, with only advice on voting members from the majority leaders of the legislature and on non-voting positions from the minority leaders. (Although at this point there's a chance the bill will be amended to revise the existing State Asset Maximization Review Board, unless the draft of the SUNY Comprehensive Asset Management Policy that I've seen simply has a typo.) Simply on balance of power grounds within New York's system of separation of powers, then, the state legislature has little reason to support the Governor's proposal.
Herein lie the seeds for a political settlement. If the state legislature is willing to concede that the campuses and the system can do a better job handling tuition policy than it has, what is the Governor willing to concede?
How about his unilateral authority to mandate cuts to the state-operated campuses' budgets? As local institutions, SUNY's community colleges and the City University of New York are not subject to this gubernatorial power, so why should the rest of SUNY? If the PHEE&IA were to redefine the state-operated campuses as public legal entities, such as "public benefit corporations," as the State University Business Officers Association has called for in "The Case for Enhanced SUNY Flexibility" (September 2008), then the Governor would be demonstrating his willingness to give up this control over SUNY budgets and setting an example for the state legislature. Or if the bill redefined his budget-cutting authority over SUNY as subject to legislative approval (within a certain period of time), he would at least allow time for the democratic process to vet his decision-making.
How about his power to appoint SUNY Trustees? If the PHEE&IA were to create a non-partisan panel of state- and nationally-recognized higher education leaders to recommend new appointments to the SUNY BOT, and if they made recommendations to a 7-person board consisting of the Governor and the majority and minority leaders and the chairs of the committees in charge of higher ed in the state Senate and Assembly, which had final authority to approve or reject the panel's recommendations, the governance of SUNY would be insulated from New York's political processes and the power to affect the membership of the ultimate authority in SUNY would be shared.
How about the initiation of the budget-setting process for SUNY? If the PHEE&IA were to create a working group on the SUNY component of the state budget consisting of representatives from DOB, SUNY System Administration, UUP, UFS, and campus presidents and business officers from each of SUNY's sectors, then they could look at historical patterns in the share of state personal income devoted to SUNY, the level of state support for SUNY per capita and per $1000 of personal income, and the share of the state general fund devoted to SUNY, and compare them to regional, national, and international data, and make a better-informed recommendation as to SUNY's funding in a given fiscal year. And if a 7-person board consisting of the Governor and the majority and minority leaders and the chairs of the committees in charge of finance in the state Senate and Assembly had the authority to revise the working group's recommendations and insert them directly into the Governor's budget bill, a consensus on an appropriate level of funding for SUNY could be developed by January of each budget cycle, which would give the committees and members of the state legislature plenty of time to double-check the board's recommendation and consult with their constituencies as they finalize the budget bill.
After making all those concessions, the Governor wouldn't have any reason or need to give up the authority granted him under the Taylor Act to bargain with state employee unions. I don't think anyone in the legislature would fault him for that. With these concessions in place, the "3 men in a room" could figure out what else needs to be improved in the PHEE&IA to make it work better for everyone in SUNY and in New York State. And perhaps be ready to listen to a united advocacy effort from SUNY, UUP, and UFS.
It's pretty clear that the PHEE&IA sidelines the state legislature while keeping the Governor firmly in charge of SUNY. After all, the legislature would have to give up control over SUNY's tuition were the bill to become law, but nothing in it changes the fact that SUNY counts as a state agency (and so is subject to unilateral funding cuts from the Governor), or that the Governor appoints the SUNY Board of Trustees, the initiates the budget-setting process for SUNY (via the Division of Budget), and negotiates with the unions representing SUNY employees (via the Governor's Office of Employee Relations). Even when the bill appears to include the state Senate and Assembly, the Governor retains control. For instance, the State University Asset Maximization Review Board it creates is appointed solely by the Governor, with only advice on voting members from the majority leaders of the legislature and on non-voting positions from the minority leaders. (Although at this point there's a chance the bill will be amended to revise the existing State Asset Maximization Review Board, unless the draft of the SUNY Comprehensive Asset Management Policy that I've seen simply has a typo.) Simply on balance of power grounds within New York's system of separation of powers, then, the state legislature has little reason to support the Governor's proposal.
Herein lie the seeds for a political settlement. If the state legislature is willing to concede that the campuses and the system can do a better job handling tuition policy than it has, what is the Governor willing to concede?
How about his unilateral authority to mandate cuts to the state-operated campuses' budgets? As local institutions, SUNY's community colleges and the City University of New York are not subject to this gubernatorial power, so why should the rest of SUNY? If the PHEE&IA were to redefine the state-operated campuses as public legal entities, such as "public benefit corporations," as the State University Business Officers Association has called for in "The Case for Enhanced SUNY Flexibility" (September 2008), then the Governor would be demonstrating his willingness to give up this control over SUNY budgets and setting an example for the state legislature. Or if the bill redefined his budget-cutting authority over SUNY as subject to legislative approval (within a certain period of time), he would at least allow time for the democratic process to vet his decision-making.
How about his power to appoint SUNY Trustees? If the PHEE&IA were to create a non-partisan panel of state- and nationally-recognized higher education leaders to recommend new appointments to the SUNY BOT, and if they made recommendations to a 7-person board consisting of the Governor and the majority and minority leaders and the chairs of the committees in charge of higher ed in the state Senate and Assembly, which had final authority to approve or reject the panel's recommendations, the governance of SUNY would be insulated from New York's political processes and the power to affect the membership of the ultimate authority in SUNY would be shared.
How about the initiation of the budget-setting process for SUNY? If the PHEE&IA were to create a working group on the SUNY component of the state budget consisting of representatives from DOB, SUNY System Administration, UUP, UFS, and campus presidents and business officers from each of SUNY's sectors, then they could look at historical patterns in the share of state personal income devoted to SUNY, the level of state support for SUNY per capita and per $1000 of personal income, and the share of the state general fund devoted to SUNY, and compare them to regional, national, and international data, and make a better-informed recommendation as to SUNY's funding in a given fiscal year. And if a 7-person board consisting of the Governor and the majority and minority leaders and the chairs of the committees in charge of finance in the state Senate and Assembly had the authority to revise the working group's recommendations and insert them directly into the Governor's budget bill, a consensus on an appropriate level of funding for SUNY could be developed by January of each budget cycle, which would give the committees and members of the state legislature plenty of time to double-check the board's recommendation and consult with their constituencies as they finalize the budget bill.
After making all those concessions, the Governor wouldn't have any reason or need to give up the authority granted him under the Taylor Act to bargain with state employee unions. I don't think anyone in the legislature would fault him for that. With these concessions in place, the "3 men in a room" could figure out what else needs to be improved in the PHEE&IA to make it work better for everyone in SUNY and in New York State. And perhaps be ready to listen to a united advocacy effort from SUNY, UUP, and UFS.
Saturday, March 20, 2010
Get Out Your Secret Decoder Rings, Ken, Nancy, and Phil!
I've been hearing from various sources that New York state's political "leaders" are going to try to rush through a 2010-2011 budget bill, perhaps as soon as this coming week. If this is true, I have some more unsolicited advice for SUNY's University Faculty Senate, System Administration, and UUP leadership. But why put it in my own words when I can borrow from the greats?
Robertson Davies: "If you don't hurry up and let life know what you want, life will damned soon show you what you'll get" (Fifth Business).
T.S. Eliot: "HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME" (The Waste Land).
William Shakespeare: "If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well/ It were done quickly" (Macbeth I.vii).
Abraham Lincoln: "Things may come to those who wait, but only the things left by those who hustle" (possibly apocryphal).
Yeah, I'm reduced to listing motivational quotations whose contexts often undermine their apparent message (and embedding a link to an analysis of a Guinness ad in lieu of an actual source for my last one!). I could add Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "fierce urgency of now" from "I Have a Dream," but that would be going over the top, wouldn't it?
Why all the silliness? Well, I'm 95% sure the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act is already dead. The only scenario I can imagine for a revival is if there's an announcement from SUNY, UUP, and UFS early next week that they've come to an agreement on what it should become, followed by a full-court press on all relevant legislators and a mass appeal to New Yorkers across a variety of media. Now, if UUP President Phil Smith cancels his planned visit to Fredonia to stay in Albany and make this happen, then I'll see some glimmer of hope. But I put the odds that all 3 organizations will be able to come to an agreement and synchronize their message at this late stage of the game around 5%.
Guinness, anyone?
[Update 1 (6:06 am): Listening to Nancy Zimpher's interview on WBFO from the 18th.]
Robertson Davies: "If you don't hurry up and let life know what you want, life will damned soon show you what you'll get" (Fifth Business).
T.S. Eliot: "HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME" (The Waste Land).
William Shakespeare: "If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well/ It were done quickly" (Macbeth I.vii).
Abraham Lincoln: "Things may come to those who wait, but only the things left by those who hustle" (possibly apocryphal).
Yeah, I'm reduced to listing motivational quotations whose contexts often undermine their apparent message (and embedding a link to an analysis of a Guinness ad in lieu of an actual source for my last one!). I could add Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "fierce urgency of now" from "I Have a Dream," but that would be going over the top, wouldn't it?
Why all the silliness? Well, I'm 95% sure the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act is already dead. The only scenario I can imagine for a revival is if there's an announcement from SUNY, UUP, and UFS early next week that they've come to an agreement on what it should become, followed by a full-court press on all relevant legislators and a mass appeal to New Yorkers across a variety of media. Now, if UUP President Phil Smith cancels his planned visit to Fredonia to stay in Albany and make this happen, then I'll see some glimmer of hope. But I put the odds that all 3 organizations will be able to come to an agreement and synchronize their message at this late stage of the game around 5%.
Guinness, anyone?
[Update 1 (6:06 am): Listening to Nancy Zimpher's interview on WBFO from the 18th.]
Friday, March 19, 2010
Phase 1 Complete of SUNY's University Faculty Senate Action Plan on the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act
Only have time today for a quick update on the action plan of the SUNY-wide University Faculty Senate. Received this on the Campus Governance Leaders listserv this morning:
I've posted the letter itself on the SUNY Fredonia University Senate ANGEL group, which you can enter as a guest via the Fredonia Senate web site and clicking on the link to the Senate ANGEL group in the top right corner. Then navigate from the "Content" tab on the left to the "Campus Initiatives" folder to the "2009-2010" folder to the "SUNY Flexibility" folder, where you'll find a veritable cornucopia of public documents and data on the PHEE&IA.
No time to add anything else right now. More coming soon, I promise, including results from my conversation with State Senator Cathy Young earlier this afternoon and my conversation with Fredonia President Dennis Hefner in just a few minutes. Only thing I'll say right now is that the UFS may have to move up its timetable if it wants to have any leverage at all in what happens before April Fool's Day.
Hi All,
Attached is the letter that I have drafted following our phone conversation earlier this week and today's very helpful conversation with the members of Executive Committee. It has been delivered to the Chancellor and the Sr. Vice Chancellor today.
The Executive Committee and I have agreed on a process for going forward:
I will draft a resolution on PHEEIA for their consideration and after discussion next week to get a document we want to take beyond the EC, it will be distributed and the sector reps will set up phone conversations with the senators in their sectors to discuss the attendant issues. After those conversations, we will meet (by phone) to discuss where we are, with the intention of coming to a resolution on the resolution.
I want to thank everyone who has assisted in this process, which is EVERYONE who has emailed their thoughts, considerations, qualms, or concerns, about either substance or process.
Without knowing the final result, I can only indicate that we have tried to act openly, with transparency at each stage, giving everyone an opportunity to learn the nuances of the many issues PHEEIA raises for us. And, then to act in an appropriate, timely manner. I understand that there may some who object to the steps that have been or will be taken, but understand this has been a process in which your voices count.
So, my heartfelt thanks all for making collaboration over long distances work.
Cordially,
Ken O'Brien
I've posted the letter itself on the SUNY Fredonia University Senate ANGEL group, which you can enter as a guest via the Fredonia Senate web site and clicking on the link to the Senate ANGEL group in the top right corner. Then navigate from the "Content" tab on the left to the "Campus Initiatives" folder to the "2009-2010" folder to the "SUNY Flexibility" folder, where you'll find a veritable cornucopia of public documents and data on the PHEE&IA.
No time to add anything else right now. More coming soon, I promise, including results from my conversation with State Senator Cathy Young earlier this afternoon and my conversation with Fredonia President Dennis Hefner in just a few minutes. Only thing I'll say right now is that the UFS may have to move up its timetable if it wants to have any leverage at all in what happens before April Fool's Day.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
What I Hope to See from State-Wide University Faculty Senate Leadership Today
Sometime this morning, I'm going to receive a draft letter from SUNY University Faculty Senate Chair Ken O'Brien addressed to SUNY Chancellor Nancy Zimpher and Senior Vice Chancellor and Chief Operating Officer Monica Rimai and cc:ed to United University Professions President Phil Smith that summarizes the consensus among the Executive Board and SUNY Senators and Campus Governance Leaders who participated in our conference call yesterday afternoon on the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act (PHEE&IA). I'm immediately going to distribute it to SUNY Fredonia University Senate officers and committee chairs, along with other active participants in our asynchronous conversation here on campus, for rapid response: comments and revision suggestions from all and an up-or-down vote from the Executive Committee on the letter itself, both of which I'll return to Ken by mid-afternoon. Once he has revised the draft, sent the final version of his letter to its addressees, and distributed it more broadly, I'll make it available on our Senate web site and ANGEL group (most of which is open to all--just drill down from "Content" to "Campus Initiatives" to "2009-2010" to "SUNY Flexibility" and download away).
Forgive me for refraining to blog on the draft letter itself--transparency does have its limits, even for me--but I'll try to make up for that by continuing to analyze the larger issues and questions raised by the PHEE&IA debates, report on responses to the UFS leadership's official letter at my campus, and explore ways of putting serious pressure on all the Albany players to do right by SUNY, individually, through the Fredonia Senate, and through the state-wide UFS.
This morning, I'll offer my own personal perspective on the PHEE&IA and on the roles SUNY UFS and campus governance bodies can play in the coming weeks. Let me start with the latter topic. Unlike campus presidents and local UUP chapter officers, who are constrained by their roles to publicly adhere to the talking points generated by their superiors (ultimately Zimpher in SUNY and Smith in UUP)--which is intended on each side to create the appearance that the dictates from Albany share wide support across the system but which in fact reinforce perceptions that SUNY is riven by labor-management/faculty-administration divides and power struggles--those involved in governance at both campus and state-wide levels are relatively free to subject both SUNY and UUP talking points and leaders to critical scrutiny, to ask difficult questions, and to withhold judgment until facts, positions, arguments, and evidence are clarified. They also have bright lines of responsibility to the constituents they were elected to represent, open lines of communication with them, and a forum that allows for some measure of deliberative democracy (should the timing of Albany politics permit campus and state-wide governance bodies to meet and vote). Finally, they have more leverage right now and in the coming days and weeks than they perhaps have ever had. This is one of those rare moments where the roles and functions of governance bodies require and enable them to enter the political realm through that good ol' "public use of reason" enlightened intellectuals are supposed to regularly provide to their societies. It's a rare case where theory and practice may coincide so neatly. If the UFS could get SUNY administrators and UUP leadership focused now at the 11th hour on what they should have been doing before the PHEE&IA was a gleam in some administrator's eye--working together, negotiating, and hammering out their differences so as to present a united front on the future of SUNY--instead of this very high-stakes game of chicken playing out in the op ed pages and letters pages of newspapers across the state, on tv and the web, and in the halls of the legislature, well, then, that would be some accomplishment.
It may not be possible. It may turn out that the differences between SUNY and UUP leadership are incommensurable. For clarification of what I mean by this term, let me turn for a moment to Michael Berube's What's Liberal About the Liberal Arts? (2006) for a lucid run-down of the Habermas-Lyotard debates and his proposed solution to the conundrum they pose. Berube patiently and vividly explains how he teaches the conflict, which to him is "looking more and more important with each passing year, and which, I think, poses such intractable problems for critical theory and political practice that our era may well be defined by them" (219).
Here's Berube's rather elegant solution:
Never mind that that's much more than one thing. Here's the key point:
So, yeah, even if the differences between Nancy Zimpher's and Phil Smith's belief systems are incommensurable, there's still a role for the UFS to play in this Lyotard-esque situation. But this may yet end up being one of those Habermasian encounters where communication leads to understanding which leads to agreement. I believe it's important to find out where we stand. If it's the latter, great. If it's the former, and Berube's dialogue-continuing questions don't resolve the impasse, then we're back to knives out: infowars for the hearts and minds of New York state citizens, taxpayers, and their elected officials.
So let's identify some of the core issues, principles, and values at stake and in play in the PHEE&IA debates. And let's advocate for what we think is right for SUNY and New Yorkers. Let's try to bring both competing parties over to our side, find principled compromises when possible, and separate controversial from non-controversial parts of the PHEE&IA out when not. Let's take advantage of the fact that both the SUNY and UUP leadership need us to legitimize their positions and try to get them both to rethink key aspects of theirs.
How about the tuition question? Here's my position in a nutshell:
And without going into any details at all on the other provisions of the PHEE&IA, let me just state baldly that the key to solving any remaining disputes can be found in the preceding paragraphs, as well as in the next few.
What I want to see from SUNY leadership, in short, is a commitment to doing everything in their power to convince all concerned parties that the system and the campuses are prepared to handle the responsibility and take advantage of the opportunities the PHEE&IA would grant it. The key part of that commitment is being open to amendments to the PHEE&IA and revisions to their draft policies that enshrine such principles as collaboration across constituencies and organizations within SUNY, power-sharing from day one and ground zero across SUNY, and robust checks and balances on all involved. If this happens, I'm ok with the fact that many things would still have to be worked out in practice. Because ultimately that experience of working together in a common cause, treating disagreements as a normal condition to be addressed openly and frankly at all levels of decision-making (not as treason or disloyalty), and trying to develop revenue streams that enhance the educational, research, and service missions of SUNY without providing rationales for further cuts in state support is all preparation, to my mind, of the larger state-wide, national, and even international consideration of the following questions that SUNY can take the lead on: namely, why public universities ought to continue to exist in the 21st century and beyond, how their roles, functions, and uses ought to be defined, what their value is (in non-economic as well as economic terms), and where their financing should come from. If all of us concerned about the future of SUNY and of public higher education were to systematically revisit these fundamental questions, consider why traditional answers to them have been losing support from citizens, taxpayers, and politicians (among others), and develop new, more compelling, answers (when needed), then we might find ways of moving out of crisis mode and into growth mode. If we can't even commit to this much, what hope is there of anyone else doing it for us?
Let's be real here: the PHEE&IA is neither panacea nor Pandora's box. Neither the best-case not worst-case scenarios for its potential impact seem very convincing. It only works as a piece of a much-larger puzzle, the other pieces of which are still being assembled as I write. So, yeah, let's all hit the reset button, roll up our sleeves, join in the assembly process, and get to work. Let's treat the people of New York as adults and level with them. Let's demand more of our elected representatives, intellectually and politically. Let's put an end to Albany-politics-as-usual. Let's call UUP's many bluffs, focus on the substantive issues, and see if we can't build bridges across what may seem at first glance to be gaping chasms.
Obviously, Ken O'Brien has to be a lot more diplomatic than I'm being here. But if he's able to state, calmly and clearly, what UFS leadership needs to see happen before it will offer its support to the PHEE&IA, and patiently explain the rationale for that provisional, qualified support to anyone and everyone who will listen, he and his colleagues may be able to help achieve what may seem unimaginable to many New Yorkers right now.
[Update 1 (3/18/10, 2:24 pm): Good job interviewing Nancy Zimpher by a U of Albany journalism class.]
Forgive me for refraining to blog on the draft letter itself--transparency does have its limits, even for me--but I'll try to make up for that by continuing to analyze the larger issues and questions raised by the PHEE&IA debates, report on responses to the UFS leadership's official letter at my campus, and explore ways of putting serious pressure on all the Albany players to do right by SUNY, individually, through the Fredonia Senate, and through the state-wide UFS.
This morning, I'll offer my own personal perspective on the PHEE&IA and on the roles SUNY UFS and campus governance bodies can play in the coming weeks. Let me start with the latter topic. Unlike campus presidents and local UUP chapter officers, who are constrained by their roles to publicly adhere to the talking points generated by their superiors (ultimately Zimpher in SUNY and Smith in UUP)--which is intended on each side to create the appearance that the dictates from Albany share wide support across the system but which in fact reinforce perceptions that SUNY is riven by labor-management/faculty-administration divides and power struggles--those involved in governance at both campus and state-wide levels are relatively free to subject both SUNY and UUP talking points and leaders to critical scrutiny, to ask difficult questions, and to withhold judgment until facts, positions, arguments, and evidence are clarified. They also have bright lines of responsibility to the constituents they were elected to represent, open lines of communication with them, and a forum that allows for some measure of deliberative democracy (should the timing of Albany politics permit campus and state-wide governance bodies to meet and vote). Finally, they have more leverage right now and in the coming days and weeks than they perhaps have ever had. This is one of those rare moments where the roles and functions of governance bodies require and enable them to enter the political realm through that good ol' "public use of reason" enlightened intellectuals are supposed to regularly provide to their societies. It's a rare case where theory and practice may coincide so neatly. If the UFS could get SUNY administrators and UUP leadership focused now at the 11th hour on what they should have been doing before the PHEE&IA was a gleam in some administrator's eye--working together, negotiating, and hammering out their differences so as to present a united front on the future of SUNY--instead of this very high-stakes game of chicken playing out in the op ed pages and letters pages of newspapers across the state, on tv and the web, and in the halls of the legislature, well, then, that would be some accomplishment.
It may not be possible. It may turn out that the differences between SUNY and UUP leadership are incommensurable. For clarification of what I mean by this term, let me turn for a moment to Michael Berube's What's Liberal About the Liberal Arts? (2006) for a lucid run-down of the Habermas-Lyotard debates and his proposed solution to the conundrum they pose. Berube patiently and vividly explains how he teaches the conflict, which to him is "looking more and more important with each passing year, and which, I think, poses such intractable problems for critical theory and political practice that our era may well be defined by them" (219).
I want to frame the Lyotard-Habermas debate as a metadebate about the purpose of debate itself, and I want to start off by impressing upon you the uncomfortable fact that, at this meta-level, we can say neither that the debate is resolvable nor that it is unresolvable. It is impossible not to take a position on this one, and worse, it is impossible not to take a position that betrays the nature of the debate.
In 1999 and 2001, this "framing" device met with a roomful of puzzled and/or exasperated looks, as well it should have. For, as I told both classes of students, it is a conundrum. It's infinitely recursive. I even wrote the form of the conundrum on the blackboard, and it went something like this: if you say the dispute between Lyotard and Habermas can in fact be resolved by principles on which both parties can ultimately agree, you are, in effect, awarding the palm to Habermas and the pro-consensus, pro-communicative action party. If, on the contrary, you give up and say that this is is simply a fundamental impasse and can't be resolved, you have in effect resolved it by awarding the palm to Lyotard and the pro-incommensurability, pro-heterogeneity party. And you can't say "neither of the above," because that too defaults to Lyotard. (229-230)
Here's Berube's rather elegant solution:
[S]ometimes the Lyotardians and the proponents of discurvive heterogeneity tend to walk away from a conflict and declare it unresolvable before they've really worked with it.... [W]hen I suggest that some postmodernists are too quick to declare a conflict unresolvable, I don't mean to reinstate the [Habermasian] demand that the ideal speech situation should be oriented toward consensus; I'm not even thinking about getting disparate parties to agree.... Instead, when I'm faced with the conflict between two parties with well-developed belief systems, I want to know one crucial thing above all: what internal protocols do they have that would enable them to change their minds about something? Do they have, for instance, an evidentiary standard, and if so, what do they admit as evidence? And what forms of authority are endowed with the capacity to decide such matters? Is there a Supreme Court, a council of elders, a parliament, a workers' collective, a Leviathan? Are there competing moral imperatives within one or the other belief system that would be likely to induce a person to reconsider his or her position on grounds that are intelligible within the belief system itself? (231-232)
Never mind that that's much more than one thing. Here's the key point:
It should...be possible to ask any belief system something like the following: even though I cannot change your mind about X, can you tell me what conditions would have to be met in order for you to consider changing your mind about X?
This meta-question does not produce (or expect) consensus, but it does attempt to make the grounds of dissensus intelligible. In this way it manages to uphold the values of reciprocal communication without seeking to guarantee that the goal of reciprocal communication will be a form of reciprocal understanding that leads to agreement....
When two people disagree about proposition X, they may not immediately agree to disagree, but they may find the discursive grounds on which to make themselves intelligible to the other, and they may, in the process, discover the grounds on which to make intelligible any further appeal to what the other person considers a plausible reason for reconsidering his (or her) position. (232-233, 235)
So, yeah, even if the differences between Nancy Zimpher's and Phil Smith's belief systems are incommensurable, there's still a role for the UFS to play in this Lyotard-esque situation. But this may yet end up being one of those Habermasian encounters where communication leads to understanding which leads to agreement. I believe it's important to find out where we stand. If it's the latter, great. If it's the former, and Berube's dialogue-continuing questions don't resolve the impasse, then we're back to knives out: infowars for the hearts and minds of New York state citizens, taxpayers, and their elected officials.
So let's identify some of the core issues, principles, and values at stake and in play in the PHEE&IA debates. And let's advocate for what we think is right for SUNY and New Yorkers. Let's try to bring both competing parties over to our side, find principled compromises when possible, and separate controversial from non-controversial parts of the PHEE&IA out when not. Let's take advantage of the fact that both the SUNY and UUP leadership need us to legitimize their positions and try to get them both to rethink key aspects of theirs.
How about the tuition question? Here's my position in a nutshell:
- SUNY is trying to resolve the dispute over whether the state's ceding of control over tuition to the SUNY Board of Trustees provides cover for the state to renege on its commitment to support the SUNY mission by addressing UUP's concerns in its draft Comprehensive Tuition Policy. This simply will not do. What's to stop the BOT from changing its policy once the bill is passed? No, SUNY has to sit down with UUP and negotiate amendments to Subpart A of the PHEE&IA itself, then jointly propose them to legislators on the relevant state Assembly and Senate committees. And in so doing it has to clarify the relationship between language in the bill and in the policy.
- If SUNY is unwilling to do this, then they have another alternative that might win UUP's support. (And if they are willing to do the above, they should be willing to do what follows, too.) Within their tuition policy, they need to revise the membership of their state-wide "Working Group" to include representatives from UUP's state-wide leadership and ensure that members of the "Executive Committee/Chancellor's Cabinet" in this group come from state-wide leadership in the Student Assembly, UFS, and Faculty Council of Community Colleges. Similarly, they need to make much more robust the notion of "consultation with campus constituencies" for any campus-initiated STR proposals--rather than the administration consulting with student government and whoever else they please, rewrite the policy to require that any STR proposal first go through a campus governance process, then go through a labor-management process, then go before the student government, and finally reach the college council. Only this will ensure a proper balance between the sometimes competing values of quality and access, an effective synthesis of the highest quality with the greatest access.
- Alternatively, SUNY might give up on a "special tuition rate" entirely--in both the bill and their policy--because of objections and concerns raised by UUP, students, and certain sectors within SUNY. Focus on what they can get this time, which is control, ending the tuition tax, and a rational tuition policy. But I still think they'll need a combination of all three of my alternatives to win a truce from UUP. And that truce is crucial to winning legislative support.
- If that's not enough, propose some version of the new system envisioned by the PHEE&IA as a pilot, to be embarked upon for a set time (say, 5 years), the results of which are to be compared jointly by SUNY, UUP, UFS, and SA with (say) the 1990-2010 period, and presented to the BOT, DOB, GOER, and relevant committees in both houses of the legislature, all as part of a process by which the state crafts revisions to the laws governing SUNY.
And without going into any details at all on the other provisions of the PHEE&IA, let me just state baldly that the key to solving any remaining disputes can be found in the preceding paragraphs, as well as in the next few.
What I want to see from SUNY leadership, in short, is a commitment to doing everything in their power to convince all concerned parties that the system and the campuses are prepared to handle the responsibility and take advantage of the opportunities the PHEE&IA would grant it. The key part of that commitment is being open to amendments to the PHEE&IA and revisions to their draft policies that enshrine such principles as collaboration across constituencies and organizations within SUNY, power-sharing from day one and ground zero across SUNY, and robust checks and balances on all involved. If this happens, I'm ok with the fact that many things would still have to be worked out in practice. Because ultimately that experience of working together in a common cause, treating disagreements as a normal condition to be addressed openly and frankly at all levels of decision-making (not as treason or disloyalty), and trying to develop revenue streams that enhance the educational, research, and service missions of SUNY without providing rationales for further cuts in state support is all preparation, to my mind, of the larger state-wide, national, and even international consideration of the following questions that SUNY can take the lead on: namely, why public universities ought to continue to exist in the 21st century and beyond, how their roles, functions, and uses ought to be defined, what their value is (in non-economic as well as economic terms), and where their financing should come from. If all of us concerned about the future of SUNY and of public higher education were to systematically revisit these fundamental questions, consider why traditional answers to them have been losing support from citizens, taxpayers, and politicians (among others), and develop new, more compelling, answers (when needed), then we might find ways of moving out of crisis mode and into growth mode. If we can't even commit to this much, what hope is there of anyone else doing it for us?
Let's be real here: the PHEE&IA is neither panacea nor Pandora's box. Neither the best-case not worst-case scenarios for its potential impact seem very convincing. It only works as a piece of a much-larger puzzle, the other pieces of which are still being assembled as I write. So, yeah, let's all hit the reset button, roll up our sleeves, join in the assembly process, and get to work. Let's treat the people of New York as adults and level with them. Let's demand more of our elected representatives, intellectually and politically. Let's put an end to Albany-politics-as-usual. Let's call UUP's many bluffs, focus on the substantive issues, and see if we can't build bridges across what may seem at first glance to be gaping chasms.
Obviously, Ken O'Brien has to be a lot more diplomatic than I'm being here. But if he's able to state, calmly and clearly, what UFS leadership needs to see happen before it will offer its support to the PHEE&IA, and patiently explain the rationale for that provisional, qualified support to anyone and everyone who will listen, he and his colleagues may be able to help achieve what may seem unimaginable to many New Yorkers right now.
[Update 1 (3/18/10, 2:24 pm): Good job interviewing Nancy Zimpher by a U of Albany journalism class.]
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
What Do the Faculty and Staff at SUNY Fredonia Think of the Empowerment Act?
With the University Faculty Senate conference call only a few hours away, I've been thinking about how best to pass along the gist of what my colleagues at SUNY Fredonia have been telling me in response to the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act (PHEE&IA). I haven't gotten a huge volume of feedback just yet, but what I can do is pass along the key ideas/themes in what I've been hearing, along with the number of people who have voiced them and representative paraphrases/quotations from my respondents. At the risk of misrepresenting the vehemence of support for the PHEE&IA as it is or with certain amendments, I'll turn the ideas/themes I'm hearing into questions, so as to further preserve their anonymity, and rank them by how often they were aired.
1. Should we support the PHEE&IA as it is, oppose it, or propose amendments to it? (9)
5 favor supporting it as is.
1 favors amending and supporting it.
2 favor opposing it.
1 is on the fence until after Phil Smith's visit to campus on March 24th.
2. Can we live with the consequences if the PHEE&IA doesn't become law? (6)
This breaks down into several related questions:
(a) how will the New York state government treat SUNY?
One of my colleagues talked to Jack Quinn (co-sponsor of UB 2020), who pointed out that Medicaid and P-12 will also need massive amounts of state support just to avoid draconian cuts when federal stimulus funds run out, and came away worried that SUNY is low on the totem pole compared to other worthy state programs.
"I suspect we will be in deep trouble when the federal stimulus money runs out. Ironically, if the Legislature had agreed to small incremental tuition increases ten years ago, we would not be in this situation. The Governor's tax on tuition was unprecedented and has deeply troubled students and faculty alike."
(b) what will be the effect on campuses, programs, employees?
"[I]f the act doesn't go through, academic programs will be cut to make up for the budget shortfall. That means loss of faculty jobs and secretarial jobs. It will mean (likely) fewer students which will be less money coming from [on-campus revenue generators like the book store, food service, and dormitories]. The domino effect is frightening...."
(c) what will be the effect on students?
If the expected cuts to campuses, programs, and employees go into effect, it'll become more difficult for students to graduate on time, which will mean they'll pay more tuition, anyway.
(d) what will be the effect on planning?
"I have worked in five states at great universities, and SUNY could be among the greatest. However, the system has been politicized and weakened by the inability to plan and implement innovative programs. Something must change soon."
3. When the state-wide leadership of UUP opposes the PHEE&IA, how well are they representing their members? (5)
This breaks down into several related questions:
(a) procedural: how did UUP's leadership arrive at their position? did they consult with local chapter leaders? did they seek input or feedback from delegates before the winter Delegate Assembly? did they give delegates time to consult the members they represent?
(b) content-based (representation as reflection, speaking as): do UUP's ad and advocacy campaigns represent their members' views on the PHEE&IA? do they present a persuasive case to oppose the PHEE&IA?
"The commercials that give the doom and gloom outlook of tuition getting beyond the reach of families fail to mention the LACK of tuition increase for how many years? That the miniscule plan developed two years ago went almost entirely to the state and NOT back to the campuses."
"The misleading television advertisements had NOTHING to do with representation of the membership, but are making political statements I find offensive, purposefully misleading and loaded with misinformation."
"I think this is one of the most important issues facing us and the rest of the SUNY system. I don't feel the UUP is right in this and it seems like the UFS is trying to be the voice of reason. I've had extensive experience with unions in my past career and I think the UUP as a whole feels threatened. They make good points but something has to be done, and the only solution I have seen from the UUP is to restore funding to past levels. It just ain't gonna happen, plain and simple. Especially once the stimulus money dries up."
(c) interest-based (representation as delegation, speaking for): is UUP leadership really acting with its members' best interests in mind?
"Union supporter or not, how someone can say a union is looking out for our interests as union members when programs will be cut which will mean loss of jobs, and union dues, is beyond me."
"I've heard a suspicion that UUP opposes the Empowerment Act because it may have a negative effect on the hospitals. If that's true, then UUP is doing the colleges a major disservice and is not representing us at all properly."
"And how, on God's green earth, when retrenchments start to happen and layoffs and all the rest, does the union justify their anti-employment stance? If members lose jobs because of their truculence and unwillingness to get out of the 'them/us' mentality, we are all going to lose, future generations most of all."
***
So that's it, so far. I'll add to this (and note updates below) as more comments come in.
[Update 1 (12:27 pm): In the interests of fairness, here's what I just received from UUP in Albany this morning:
Keep up the pressure: PHEEIA not a panacea
UUPers are succeeding in convincing lawmakers, colleagues, students and community members that further budget cuts and flexibility without oversight will cause SUNY more harm than good.
But we can't stop yet.
Despite signs that lawmakers are beginning to see the problems inherent in the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act (PHEEIA), SUNY administrators are relentless in billing the flex legislation as a solution to New York's economic woes and as a way to strengthen public higher education. SUNY has expended a great deal of time and money in an all-out effort to sell PHEEIA as a panacea.
The union is fighting back.
In addition to statewide efforts to convince the powers-that-be to reject PHEEIA, UUP is asking chapters to step up their efforts to educate everyone on the facts of this ill-conceived legislation. And everyone means everyone. Don't assume that your colleagues or your students understand UUP's position.
Ask your students: Do you realize tuition could skyrocket? Chances are, they've seen SUNY's eye-catching propaganda and have been reeled in hook, line and sinker.
Ask your colleagues: Do you really believe SUNY will act in your best interests if your campus is able to enter into public/private partnerships without legislative oversight?
If you're looking for ideas on how to proceed, follow the lead of the UUP chapters at Albany, Farmingdale, Plattsburgh and New Paltz. Here’s what they’re doing:
• On March 18 at UAlbany, UUPers are hosting a forum on "A Progressive Vision of SUNY’s Future: Alternatives to PHEEIA." Presenters are UUP President Phil Smith and Frank Mauro, executive director of the Fiscal Policy Institute. The program is from 5:30-7:30 p.m. in the Campus Center, Room 375.
• New Paltz UUPers, along with NYPIRG, students and community members, are rallying at noon March 24 in the Humanities Concourse to protest SUNY budget cuts and tuition increases.
• Plattsburgh Chapter President Dave Curry was a panelist during a PHEEIA forum sponsored by the campus Student Association. Curry faced off against John Homburger, VP for administration and business affairs.
• Farmingdale has distributed fliers that direct people to SaveSUNY.org, left.
What else can I do?
• Reprint UUP ads in chapter newsletters or post them to chapter Web sites. The ads are available on UUP LeaderNet or from the union’s Communications Department.
• Keep the faxes coming. Tell family, friends, colleagues and students to get the facts on PHEEIA and budget cuts and encourage them to send letters to lawmakers by going to SaveSUNY.org. The letters can also be found at uupinfo.org.
• Share the union's recommendations for revenue enhancements to help overcome New York’s fiscal crisis. Working in coalition with A Better Choice for New York, UUP and other labor and community groups crafted viable alternatives to spending cuts. For more details and an easy-to-read handout to share with lawmakers, go to www.abetterchoiceforny.org.
• Urge your members to take part in advocacy days in Albany. Coming up are NYSUT's Committee of 100 on March 16, and UUP Constituency Group Advocacy Day on March 23.
• Schedule visits with lawmakers in their district offices. Contact the union's Legislation and Communications departments if you need assistance or materials.
***
No time for a comment.]
[Update 2 (3:05 pm): Updated the numbers above. Got a very thoughtful comment from a colleague that's better to quote at length:
Keep those comments coming!]
1. Should we support the PHEE&IA as it is, oppose it, or propose amendments to it? (9)
5 favor supporting it as is.
1 favors amending and supporting it.
2 favor opposing it.
1 is on the fence until after Phil Smith's visit to campus on March 24th.
2. Can we live with the consequences if the PHEE&IA doesn't become law? (6)
This breaks down into several related questions:
(a) how will the New York state government treat SUNY?
One of my colleagues talked to Jack Quinn (co-sponsor of UB 2020), who pointed out that Medicaid and P-12 will also need massive amounts of state support just to avoid draconian cuts when federal stimulus funds run out, and came away worried that SUNY is low on the totem pole compared to other worthy state programs.
"I suspect we will be in deep trouble when the federal stimulus money runs out. Ironically, if the Legislature had agreed to small incremental tuition increases ten years ago, we would not be in this situation. The Governor's tax on tuition was unprecedented and has deeply troubled students and faculty alike."
(b) what will be the effect on campuses, programs, employees?
"[I]f the act doesn't go through, academic programs will be cut to make up for the budget shortfall. That means loss of faculty jobs and secretarial jobs. It will mean (likely) fewer students which will be less money coming from [on-campus revenue generators like the book store, food service, and dormitories]. The domino effect is frightening...."
(c) what will be the effect on students?
If the expected cuts to campuses, programs, and employees go into effect, it'll become more difficult for students to graduate on time, which will mean they'll pay more tuition, anyway.
(d) what will be the effect on planning?
"I have worked in five states at great universities, and SUNY could be among the greatest. However, the system has been politicized and weakened by the inability to plan and implement innovative programs. Something must change soon."
3. When the state-wide leadership of UUP opposes the PHEE&IA, how well are they representing their members? (5)
This breaks down into several related questions:
(a) procedural: how did UUP's leadership arrive at their position? did they consult with local chapter leaders? did they seek input or feedback from delegates before the winter Delegate Assembly? did they give delegates time to consult the members they represent?
(b) content-based (representation as reflection, speaking as): do UUP's ad and advocacy campaigns represent their members' views on the PHEE&IA? do they present a persuasive case to oppose the PHEE&IA?
"The commercials that give the doom and gloom outlook of tuition getting beyond the reach of families fail to mention the LACK of tuition increase for how many years? That the miniscule plan developed two years ago went almost entirely to the state and NOT back to the campuses."
"The misleading television advertisements had NOTHING to do with representation of the membership, but are making political statements I find offensive, purposefully misleading and loaded with misinformation."
"I think this is one of the most important issues facing us and the rest of the SUNY system. I don't feel the UUP is right in this and it seems like the UFS is trying to be the voice of reason. I've had extensive experience with unions in my past career and I think the UUP as a whole feels threatened. They make good points but something has to be done, and the only solution I have seen from the UUP is to restore funding to past levels. It just ain't gonna happen, plain and simple. Especially once the stimulus money dries up."
(c) interest-based (representation as delegation, speaking for): is UUP leadership really acting with its members' best interests in mind?
"Union supporter or not, how someone can say a union is looking out for our interests as union members when programs will be cut which will mean loss of jobs, and union dues, is beyond me."
"I've heard a suspicion that UUP opposes the Empowerment Act because it may have a negative effect on the hospitals. If that's true, then UUP is doing the colleges a major disservice and is not representing us at all properly."
"And how, on God's green earth, when retrenchments start to happen and layoffs and all the rest, does the union justify their anti-employment stance? If members lose jobs because of their truculence and unwillingness to get out of the 'them/us' mentality, we are all going to lose, future generations most of all."
***
So that's it, so far. I'll add to this (and note updates below) as more comments come in.
[Update 1 (12:27 pm): In the interests of fairness, here's what I just received from UUP in Albany this morning:
Keep up the pressure: PHEEIA not a panacea
UUPers are succeeding in convincing lawmakers, colleagues, students and community members that further budget cuts and flexibility without oversight will cause SUNY more harm than good.
But we can't stop yet.
Despite signs that lawmakers are beginning to see the problems inherent in the Public Higher Education Empowerment and Innovation Act (PHEEIA), SUNY administrators are relentless in billing the flex legislation as a solution to New York's economic woes and as a way to strengthen public higher education. SUNY has expended a great deal of time and money in an all-out effort to sell PHEEIA as a panacea.
The union is fighting back.
In addition to statewide efforts to convince the powers-that-be to reject PHEEIA, UUP is asking chapters to step up their efforts to educate everyone on the facts of this ill-conceived legislation. And everyone means everyone. Don't assume that your colleagues or your students understand UUP's position.
Ask your students: Do you realize tuition could skyrocket? Chances are, they've seen SUNY's eye-catching propaganda and have been reeled in hook, line and sinker.
Ask your colleagues: Do you really believe SUNY will act in your best interests if your campus is able to enter into public/private partnerships without legislative oversight?
If you're looking for ideas on how to proceed, follow the lead of the UUP chapters at Albany, Farmingdale, Plattsburgh and New Paltz. Here’s what they’re doing:
• On March 18 at UAlbany, UUPers are hosting a forum on "A Progressive Vision of SUNY’s Future: Alternatives to PHEEIA." Presenters are UUP President Phil Smith and Frank Mauro, executive director of the Fiscal Policy Institute. The program is from 5:30-7:30 p.m. in the Campus Center, Room 375.
• New Paltz UUPers, along with NYPIRG, students and community members, are rallying at noon March 24 in the Humanities Concourse to protest SUNY budget cuts and tuition increases.
• Plattsburgh Chapter President Dave Curry was a panelist during a PHEEIA forum sponsored by the campus Student Association. Curry faced off against John Homburger, VP for administration and business affairs.
• Farmingdale has distributed fliers that direct people to SaveSUNY.org, left.
What else can I do?
• Reprint UUP ads in chapter newsletters or post them to chapter Web sites. The ads are available on UUP LeaderNet or from the union’s Communications Department.
• Keep the faxes coming. Tell family, friends, colleagues and students to get the facts on PHEEIA and budget cuts and encourage them to send letters to lawmakers by going to SaveSUNY.org. The letters can also be found at uupinfo.org.
• Share the union's recommendations for revenue enhancements to help overcome New York’s fiscal crisis. Working in coalition with A Better Choice for New York, UUP and other labor and community groups crafted viable alternatives to spending cuts. For more details and an easy-to-read handout to share with lawmakers, go to www.abetterchoiceforny.org.
• Urge your members to take part in advocacy days in Albany. Coming up are NYSUT's Committee of 100 on March 16, and UUP Constituency Group Advocacy Day on March 23.
• Schedule visits with lawmakers in their district offices. Contact the union's Legislation and Communications departments if you need assistance or materials.
***
No time for a comment.]
[Update 2 (3:05 pm): Updated the numbers above. Got a very thoughtful comment from a colleague that's better to quote at length:
1. Of the 4 choices given I would have to favor opposing it. I would support something that was crafted jointly between SUNY, GOER, and UUP. However, I do not think that qualifies as favoring amending and supporting the act. I think, like we did locally with the personnel policies, the initial proposal could be considered but that this process needs to start over and happen with all parties represented from the beginning. SUNY and the Governor should not be striking back room deals. Proper protocol should be followed and basic things like involving all stakeholders from the beginning should be observed.
2. Yes.
2.a. The state already treats SUNY like the red-headed stepchild. SUNY gets cut the most and more frequently than even CUNY and the SUNY Community Colleges and certainly before Corrections or other areas of the budget. The PHEEIA will not change that, even if it becomes law. The only way to fix this problem is to remove the anti-SUNY Governor we currently have, along with any anti-SUNY legislators and anti-SUNY SUNY Board members, and get people in power positions who understand the value of a strong public higher education system outside of NYC.
2.b. Even if the PHEEIA becomes law it will not magically make money fall from the sky. It is naïve to think that the state will continue to provide funding to SUNY, even at its current low levels, if SUNY retains all of its tuition dollars. The tuition that SUNY pulls in will not be able to pay the bills either. Cuts will continue to happen.
2.c. See the answer to 2.b. These cuts will affect students' ability to graduate in four years. More troubling is that if the PHEEIA passes, economically disadvantaged people may be priced out of the higher education market completely.
2.d. Those doing the planning should understand the rules and procedures in place and play by the rules. The PHEEIA is simply those people saying I don’t understand the rules, I can’t be bothered trying to learn them, so here are rules I want to follow. It is irresponsible to do this. Any entry- to mid-level employee who refused to follow procedure and instead created their own rules would quickly be replaced. Why is it OK for the SUNY elite to collect their giant salaries while gutting the NYS public higher education system?
The 31 SUNY Presidents plus Chancellor Zimpher collectively earned $7,701,228.15 according to 2009 payroll data from SeeThroughNY.org. If SUNY is hurting so bad for money why don’t these elite earn a regular salary (capped at $150,000 perhaps?), and maybe even pay rent to live in the State owned properties and other perks they have access to, instead of threatening to cut the jobs of the common people? Capping the salaries of just that small number of elites at $150,000 would save almost 3 million dollars annually. Why hasn’t that proposal come forward? Capping dean’s salaries at $100,000 would save more than 6 million dollars annually considering the 146 deans listed on SeeThroughNY. Similarly, capping the VP salaries at $125,000 would save almost 7 million dollars annually of the 116 VPs listed. Where are the proposals to cut from the SUNY administration? Let’s retrench the deans and VPs alongside the faculty.
3. Of those who are informed of all of the issues, I would say pretty well. Of those who want to trust the SUNY administration blindly, or who are pushing a privatization agenda, probably poorly.
3.a. I would counter with a question: How did the SUNY elite and the Governor arrive at the PHEEIA? Did they consult the citizens of NY? Did they consult the employees of SUNY? Did they consult the unions representing the employees of SUNY? Did they consult the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations?
3.b. Do the SUNY pro-PHEEIA ads and anti-union propaganda represent the views of NYS citizens? Do they present a persuasive case to support the PHEEIA? The SUNY elite are acting like the spoiled child who when things aren’t going their way takes their ball and goes home. If they don’t get their way (passing the PHEEIA) they will take their ball (jobs) and go home. The SUNY elite need to understand that a public higher education institution is a PUBLIC institution, not a private one. If they want to work for a private institution they should apply at one, not try to gut SUNY and turn it into a private institution.
3.c. Are the SUNY elite really acting with NYS citizens' best interests in mind? Remember, the poor and disadvantaged are citizens just like the wealthy and privileged. This argument is falling along class lines, with the SUNY elite wanting to become more elite and the union trying to keep SUNY a public institution. We are allowing a few highly-paid people to lay the groundwork for removing the one chance at social-economic advancement that many NYS citizens have. Pretty soon the only place the poor and disadvantaged of NY will be able to go is to prison. Maybe some people don’t have a problem with that, but I do.
I agree that something needs to be done and that we can’t just expect money to come falling from the sky. However, whatever proposal that comes forth must be a product of at least three groups working collaboratively from the beginning: SUNY, the unions representing SUNY employees, and the GOER.
Keep those comments coming!]
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